Cohesion and disintegration in the Afghan National Army
Brian M Downing
Afghanistan’s army has excellent equipment, including night-fighting equipment, has been well trained, and has a great deal of combat experience. Nonetheless, it has serious problems most of which predate the Taliban’s ongoing offensive. It’s unlikely to hold the west and it may well collapse.
The ANA is hamstrung by the same diverse ethnic composition that weakens the political system. Soldiers are Pashtun, or Tajik, or Uzbek, or Hazara, or Turkmen. There is considerable tension if not animosity between those ethnic groups, in and out of the army. Discussion of one group with someone of another often leads to tirades on their worthlessness and degeneracy. That bodes ill for unit cohesion, as does the absence of a common language.
The Taliban was driven out of the country in 2001 by Northern Alliance troops, aided of course by US advisors and airpower. Northern Alliance units were Tajik or Uzbek for the most part, with little intermixing. The victorious northerners played important roles in creating the ANA and placed officers of their ethnicity in key positions, especially battalion, brigade, and division commands. They had experience, they had won, and they constituted a sound basis for the new ANA.
When Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun and an irremediably corrupt one, became president he replaced many commanders with Pashtun officers who were less experienced than the Northern predecessors. Their chief qualifications were loyalty to Karzai. This led to mistrust between commanders and the rank and file.
Corruption plagues the entire army. Soldiers know their officers got their positions through connections rather than qualifications. It’s one thing to realize that in garrison, quite another in combat. An effective unit cannot rely on timely support from sister units, so why put yourself in danger? The logistical system is inept. Soldiers cannot count on timely deliveries of food and ammo. Isolated garrisons surrender not because of a lack of fighting spirit but because of supply failures.
The ANA is holding on in many places, including Lashkar Gah, Herat, and Kandahar. The latter was the Taliban capital in the nineties and they want it back before talks become serious. In these urban battles the ANA has the advantages of fighting behind defensive fortification and considerable air support. The soldiers may also be motivated by the absence of a way out of beleaguered positions and the fear that capture means grisly executions.
The ANA is now overstretched, fighting in many parts of the country and losing ground in many of them. The army may hold here and there but it cannot turn the tide. Things to watch for:
The bulk of the fighting has been done by special forces units trained by the US and led by officers generally outside the Kabul patronage system. The units are tough, seasoned, and courageous, but they’ve been fighting too long and have taken too many casualties. If they should break or head north to link up with old warlords, the end will come swiftly.
The Taliban’s success in the early nineties was based in part on military conquest but also on negotiations with locals. Taliban commanders met with local notables, invoked customs to settle disputes amicably when possible, and convinced many chiefs, warlords, and officers to switch sides. They were highly successful when they had established momentum, as they have now. Their entreaties will be all the more attractive after 42 years of warfare.
A local commander in Samangan province recently went over to the Taliban. Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum switched sides during the Russian war and is now facing criminal charges. He recently returned to Afghanistan where he has a sizable militia in the north. He can see the war’s direction as well as anyone.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.