Brian M Downing
Russia invaded Ukraine with expectations of taking Kyiv and many other cities in a matter of days. It was overly-ambitious and showed little understanding of military realities. It was also a deviation from the Russian way of war: protracted intense artillery bombardments devastate everything ahead and open paths for ground forces. It was used extensively in WW2 and more recently in Chechnya and Syria. The ruins of Grozny and Aleppo attest to it.
Heavy artillery has opened the way to Severodonetsk in the Donbas. What’s the significance of that advance and how can Ukraine respond? Just why did Russia try blitzkrieg at the outset of the war?
Blitzkrieg
Why didn’t Russia use its traditional way in February? It had little understanding of its army’s abilities and limitations. Over the two decades of Putin’s rule, the army was given money and resources and presented to a welcoming public as a powerful symbol of the might it had in WW2.
However, the generals were obsequious to authority, forgiving of corruption, and devoid of professional qualifications. The army is an immense Potemkin village with meretricious uniforms, inferior equipment, and poorly-trained serfs.
Putin and his generals nonetheless felt the army could quickly overwhelm Ukraine. A quick win would bring prestige and glory. Eastern Europe would be fearful and deferent, as the stage would be set for blitzkriegs in Moldova, the Baltic States, and beyond. NATO would be divided and paralyzed. China would be impressed and respectful.
But the strategy failed badly. Putin and his generals had to rethink the war’s prosecution. They reverted to the Russian way of war.
The Donbas campaign
The eastern offensive has made some ground in the central area, especially around Severodonetsk. Russian artillery was concentrated and intense, leveling much of the city. Big guns were probably taken from sister units to increase the firepower. The ground attack has likely been done by the most reliable units.
Russian gains are thus far only incremental. Ukrainian troops, experienced and knowledgeable of every street and alley, are inflicting casualties as they slowly give up ground. If driven from Severodonetsk, they will set up in surrounding fields and on the streets of the next town. This defense in depth is grinding down Russia’s best, and there aren’t many of them.
Responses
Concentration of artillery and the best troops in one place means dilution elsewhere. Ukrainian forces may probe for weaknesses and force Russia to rethink its offensive and redeploy from the Donbas.
As noted previously, Ukrainian pressure near Kharkiv endangers Russian positions in the northern Donbas. Perhaps more concerning for Russia is the Ukrainian effort north of Kherson which threatens Russia’s hold on the western part of the land bridge.
Artillery is central now. Each side is pounding the other’s front positions and trying to find and destroy the other’s artillery positions. The siege of Dien Bien Phu began with artillery duels and when the French artillery commander realized he couldn’t silence the Viet Minh guns, he killed himself. It’s essential that Ukraine silence its enemy’s guns.
Aerial reconnaissance, satellites, helpful civilians, and electronic intelligence must find Russian guns. Recently-deployed weapons use radar to track incoming rounds and fire rockets in response in a few seconds. Otherwise, Ukrainian troops will suffer more casualties and more cities will look like Grozny and Aleppo.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.