Brian M Downing
The new administration will face a welter of foreign policy problems. Some of them were caused by the present administration, others are of longer duration that can be placed at the feet of Bush the Younger and Barack Obama. One of them is Syria.
The US has about five hundred troops in the landlocked east where they support an unstable alliance of Kurdish and Arab militias. The troops are occasionally attacked by Turkish troops, Russian mercenaries, Syrian forces, and a resurgent ISIL. The presence is of questionable importance to US security.
The presence
When Syria’s Arab Spring turned violent and foreign powers intervened on both sides, the Obama administration sat on the sidelines. But as the war dragged on, Obama authorized the formation of Syrian recruits to back the rebels and end the war. One group melted away shortly after crossing into Syria, another was more eager to cash checks in the rear than fight Assad’s forces.
When ISIL flared to prominence in both Syria and Iraq, the Obama administration responded with airstrikes and advisors. As the war ground on, it sent in more advisors, logistical help, medical personnel, and artillery units – mission creep.
The Trump administration oversaw ISIL’s last stands but kept the GIs there for various unstated and open-ended options – mission leap. There is a residual ISIL presence (and will be for a generation or more). American and indigenous troops could one day choke off lines of communication between Iran and its Syrian and Hisbollah allies. The US may be willing to withdraw if Assad were to break with or greatly reduce ties to Iran. The region could become an autonomous region or independent state.
The future
Aside from maintaining the vague status quo, Biden has several options. None are attractive.
The president could order a pullout, rapid or incremental, over a year or so. This is what Candidate Trump called for and President Trump ordered (twice), but most US troops remained. Criticism would be considerable as the Kurds have been stalwart allies in both Syria and Iraq. Paradoxically, Trump and his legions would be the loudest. The Sunni states and the defense lobby in Washington would try to block withdrawal. The bejeweled princes buy US weaponry not to build effective armies but to win influence in Washington. Israel too would object to easing the pressure on Iran.
A second option is consolidating the Kurdish-Arab east into an autonomous region or statelet. Turkey is doing the same along its border with Syria. Accomplishing this without an enduring American presence would prove difficult, but the Sunni princes could support the region financially and subsidize backup troops from Jordan, Egypt, or private contractors. Broader plans might include detaching Sunni and Kurdish regions from Iraq. Ambitious to be sure, but it’s nothing Biden wants to wade into.
As much as the Kurds deserve a state, it’s clear they are too divided by language, tribes, and politics to govern themselves. That became painfully clear when Iraq’s Kurdistan swiftly fell apart in the face off Turkish and Iraqi incursions.
Third, the US could encourage the Kurds and Arabs to negotiate partial reintegration into Syria. The Kurds were never at war with Assad. In fact, early in the civil war he offered autonomy in exchange for their neutrality. The Kurds fought far more with ISIL and other jihadi groups.
Obviously, Assad’s word on autonomy couldn’t be trusted but his army is depleted and the Kurdish-Arab troops are dug in. Longer term, an eastern statelet could triangulate between Syria and Turkey, perhaps with Russian arbitration. Putin would welcome an opportunity to expand Russian influence at the expense of the US.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.