Brian M Downing
The Biden administration faces several foreign policy issues. Some are the result of his predecessor’s inattention, inconsistency, and missteps. Others go back to the Obama and Bush years. One of the more vexing, longterm problems is our relationship with Saudi Arabia. That goes back to Franklin Roosevelt’s tenure. Is Riyadh a meaningful ally? Where is the alignment heading?
Background
US-Saudi relations go back to 1945 when FDR parleyed with King Abdul Aziz on a cruiser anchored in the Suez Canal. The US, the two leaders agreed, would defend the kingdom, develop its oil resources, and ship the crude to war-ravaged Europe. The US was deeply concerned that its own reserves had been overused in the world war. Better to use Arab oil.
As Americans bought more cars and lived farther from workplaces, oil consumption rose – but production fell. The US came to rely on oil from the Saudis and other Gulf principalities, though it took the ’73 boycott for us to realize it. The Nixon administration, facing a steep trade imbalance, convinced the princes to build up their armies – with US military hardware and training missions.
Over the last decade or so, US oil production soared and imports from the Gulf dwindled. The basis of the Washington-Riyadh partnership shifted from Saudi oil to American arms. That did not reverse the power imbalance shown in ’73. Saudi defense expenditures are intended to win influence with US defense industries and congress. It’s money well spent, from their perspective.
However, the new power relationship presents formidable problems for the US. The Biden foreign policy team must at least begin to realize that.
Saudi Arabia as a strategic ally
Allies are supposed to strengthen each other’s military power. That’s what every alliance has sought since the days of the Greek city-states. But how useful is the Saudi military? The kingdom has two armies – a national army comprising volunteers and conscripts from the whole kingdom, and a national guard made up of tribal militias. The national guard is an homage to Abduz Aziz’s hosts that conquered the peninsula after World War One and a counterbalance in the event the regular army proves disloyal. Such are the anxieties inside the House of Saud.
Money does not ensure effectiveness. Saudi troops march and salute smartly and put on impressive displays on parade grounds in front of the royal family, members of which dominate the upper ranks. But they’re not good soldiers. An uprising in Mecca by a few hundred zealots shook the kingdom and was put down by French mercenaries. In Gulf War One (1991) US generals deemed the Saudi contingent unfit for combat. In Yemen, Saudi troops adroitly avoid combat. A cross-border raid by a Houthi band mauled a Saudi battalion and sent survivors packing.
Saudi weapons purchases are not intended to build an effective army. The deals are made with western countries that have strong armies, especially the US, Britain, and France. The expectation is that those countries will defend the kingdom lest they lose billions of dollars of arms contracts.
The Saudi calculations are cynical, craven, and correct. Over the years the US, Britain, and France have expelled Iraq from Kuwait, established a holding position in eastern Syria, and helped the flagging Sunni war in Yemen with arms and intelligence. Conflict with Iran looms intermittently.
US energy independence
The Saudis own large refineries on the Texas coast which naturally are required to use Arab Light. Riyadh also own thousands of retail gas stations in the US to maintain prices and market share. More importantly, however, it has sabotaged the US oil industry that had rebounded in previous decades.
Almost half a century ago, just after the Arab oil embargo, President Nixon vowed to make America energy independent again, as it was until the 1950s. Little came of it though. More recently, fracking and other technologies have boosted domestic production, especially from shale formations in Texas. The US overtook Saudi Arabia in oil production.
We were #1 again and poised to become a major exporter. That threatened Saudi Arabia’s market share and reduced its ability to affect world prices, at last for a while. Mohammed bin Salman jacked production twice, in part to get Putin to agree to production guidelines, but also to cripple the US oil industry. Prices fell, rig counts plummeted, production dropped.
Though prices have come back up from 2020 lows, the threat of another price collapse persists. Domestic producers are reluctant to reopen rigs and invest as long as the threat of Saudi market manipulations persists. MBS can strike again.
Allies do not wreck each other’s industries and national goals.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.