Brian M Downing
The US has been involved in the long war in Yemen since it erupted in 2015. The Obama administration supported the Saudi-Emirati forces who backed the southern Sunnis against the northern Shia. It did so out of concern that amid the chaos AQ and ISIL were finding safe areas, but more importantly because the Saudis and Emiratis purchased copious amounts of US military equipment. The Trump administration maintained support for the same reasons.
The Yemen war is stalemated, the southern Sunni are deeply divided now, and the Yemeni people have been hit hard by war, famine, plague, and failed conquests by north and south. The Biden administration wants to avoid being the third presidency to back this war which is related more to our arms industry than our national security. There are ways to do this and reap important and badly needed benefits as well.
The conflict
It’s now well known that the Middle East’s boundaries were drawn by outside powers with little concern for homogeneity and viability. Iraq, Syria, and Libya are cases in point – and all facing fragmentation. Yemen is the unhappy joining of a northern Shia region that was once an Ottoman province and a southern Sunni region that was long in the British sphere.
The post-colonial union never worked. Civil wars broke out, peace agreements have never endured. Yemen is in its third major war as the Houthi movement rose to oppose Saudi-Wahhabi influence. Two amalgams of militias are squaring off against each other. One side is backed by Sunni powers, the other by Iran.
Initially, the northerners drove deep into the south and seemed on the verge of taking Aden. That would have given them a powerful negotiating position. However, the northerners encountered firmer opposition and inhospitable populations. They pulled back and now the lines are fairly stable. Casualties and suffering continue.
What would a Sunni victory bring?
If Sunni forces that the US is extending support to were to win, what would that bring. After all, victories in wars bring new problems to the victors.
Conquest of the northern Shia would not bring peace. It would only end large-scale fighting. The regional, cultural, and historical differences are deep and at this point irreconcilable. The Shia will never accept Sunni rule. They would continue the fight with guerrilla tactics, with or without Iranian support.
Victory would embolden Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman. He would press the Yemeni government to oppress the Shia as diligently as he does in his country. He would be emboldened to expand his power in the region, especially with the Sunnis of Iraq and Syria. He would increase his support for terrorism and separatism inside Iran.
US policies
The war is a stalemate and unrelated to US security. Even if victory somehow came, the US would be saddled with new difficulties. The new administration realizes at least the first point and is looking to cut off military support to the Sunni belligerents.
Biden has paused arms sales to Saudi Arabia. This signals concern with the war but a full stop will face resistance from both sides in Congress. The move positions the US to press for a dialog between north and south, perhaps with the UAE taking part as well. The Emiratis are amenable to partition which is the only viable solution. (That view was presented here in 2015.)
– Negotiations would shore up America’s image in the world by demonstrating leadership and diplomacy, both of which have slipped in recent years.
– Yemen and its people would benefit from an end to hostilities and embargoes. Humanitarian aid could flow in.
– AQ and ISIL would in time lose their sanctuaries in the south where they’ve ensconced themselves amid the chaos.
– Diplomacy in Yemen will help ease tensions between the US and Iran.
– It would signal the Saudis that the US and its military are not at their beck and call, regardless of their defense spending.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.