Brian M Downing
Protests are jarring many countries. In recent days, after an election gave a suspicious win to a longstanding ruler, Belarus is now in the rapids. Once part of the Soviet Union, and situated between Russia and the EU (geographically and geopolitically), Belarus is closely watched by western powers and Russia.
Triangulation
Belarus’s authoritarian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, was once a staunch member of the Soviet Union’s communist party. After independence, he became a populist politician but he preferred a strong hand. That of course is the outlook of Vladimir Putin, just to the east.
Lukashenko has sought to triangulate between Russia and the West. He rebuffed Putin’s request for a large military base north of the Ukraine, limiting the Russian presence to a radar station and communication outpost. He recently inked a deal to purchase natural gas from the US, snubbing Putin again and causing concern in Moscow of further meshing with the West.
Political dynamics
Lukashenko thought he could ride the antidemocratic tide in the world, slowly restricting freedoms and electoral norms. The tide is especially strong in neighboring Poland and Hungary where movements opposed to immigration, diversity, and globalism have won high office and solidified holds.
However, Lukashenko’s rule has been marked by corruption and economic failure and Belarusians could not look past an obviously rigged election. They are pushing hard to oust him.
The authoritarian tide in the world is accompanied by large-scale youth mobilization. We saw it a few years ago in the Arab Spring which drove rulers out of Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen and caused others to tremble. More recently, mass protests have come to the US, Lebanon, France, Iraq, and Iran. An authoritarian tide and a populist one are arising simultaneously, though there’s considerable populism in authoritarianism and a great deal of intolerance in youth mobilization.
Lukashenko’s options
Several recent mass protests have been squashed – Egypt, Iran, and to a lesser extent Iraq. Lukashenko is thought to have considerable repressive capacity and Minsk wasn’t going to resemble Portland, not for a day.
There are two possibilities why a harsher crackdown has not yet come: Lukashenko is reluctant to use force for fear of a powerful popular counterstrike, or his security forces aren’t sufficiently detached from the public and may not be reliable.
Lukashenko’s second option is to delay, distract, and promise change, hoping the mobilization will dissipate and life will go on – with him still on top. He has promised to share power, called for new elections, and suggested constitutional changes.
This is SOP in the dictator handbook. Governments in Algeria and the Sudan have tried it but met with failure. The opposition was too smart and it kept up the pressure. There’s no sign of dissipation in Belarus. The opposition is being joined by workers and state firms – surely an embarrassment for an old communist official.
The third option is to secure foreign help to quash protests. Bahrain teetered during the Arab Spring, until Saudi and Pakistani security forces intervened. Iran and Russia stepped in to bolster Assad in Syria. Lukashenko has been in contact with Putin. He’s even claimed, falsely, that NATO troops were massing on his western border. This was designed to alarm Putin and remind him of his country’s actions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1981).
Putin is alarmed by events in his Near Abroad and Minsk isn’t far from Moscow at all. The threat of a democratic movement spreading east isn’t great, but a westward-leaning Belarus would be a blow to Putin’s prestige. Belarus joining NATO someday would be devastating.
Putin wants Lukashenko or someone like him to stay in power and he’s willing to help stamp out the opposition. He sent Wagner Group mercenaries into Belarus last month, possibly to cause trouble that would justify intervention in the event of an unfavorable election. They were immediately snatched up and imprisoned.
But Putin must be sobered by growing crowds in Minsk. Their anger is aimed at Lukashenko for now but they could pose a serious problem for Russian security forces. And a failed intervention would move the public closer to the West.
Belarusians are not ill disposed toward Russians, as are, say, Poles and Ukrainians. They are amicable cousins and reintegration with Moscow has been considered over the years. But they know Putin stands for authoritarian rule and they’ve had their fill of it. The words for “freedom” and “liberty” are prominent on their signs.
The opposition’s options
The protesters must first of all keep up their presence on the streets and continue garnering support in civil society. Foreign demonstrators might be helpful as well.
Negotiations might be conducted with security forces and army units. Officers might announce opposition to Lukashenko and foreign intervention as well. All the better if they did so at the head of their assembled battalions.
The opposition must form a coherent political bloc capable of governing the country. Crowds on the street cannot govern. Neither can dozens of antagonistic parties that are in the legislature today. Lukashenko and Putin know that. They may accede to protesters for the time being and allow the rivalrous parties to misgovern Belarus for a protracted period and pave the way for weary acceptance of a new strong man.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.