Brian M Downing
The Black Sea
Russia’s most successful efforts have been along the Black Sea and Crimean peninsula. Drives from bases in Crimea and supported by the navy drove swiftly west to Kherson and east to Melitopol. The navy famously took Snake Island on the first day. The small outpost there was intended to support the blockade of Ukrainian ports and a campaign across the land bridge to Odessa and beyond, landlocking Ukraine. The campaign is on hold but naval vessels fire missiles on population centers.
Ukrainian operations
Kyiv has been active in the region. A Russian-operated oil platform was hit and set ablaze. The sinking of Moskva brought praise for the plucky underdogs and derision for the haughty admirals. Snake Island has been beleaguered for some time, like a remote colonial outpost in the desert. Garrison troops were repeatedly hit, supply ships sunk or damaged. This week, after a pummeling from a Ukrainian-made howitzer, the Russians abandoned it.
The recent acquisition of US and British antiship missiles will allow Ukraine to be more aggressive. In recent days an American Global Hawk drone has been flying reconnaissance over the Black Sea, especially in waters between Snake Island and the Crimea. Large and slow, the drone signals the Russian navy that Ukraine has watchful help overhead.
Russian reaction
Russian ships would do well to stay out to sea, but those at anchor in Sebastopol and other Crimean ports will remain in danger, as will fuel and ammunition depots.
Russian admirals face a dilemma. They can pull their ships away from the coast and reduce the numbers in port as well. They would become a fleet in being only, like the German surface ships of World War One, which wary of British and French navies, stayed in port for much of the war.
This makes sense but presents problems. The navy is best known not for victories but for losses – Moskva, several other ships, and Snake Island. It’s eager to play as prominent a role as the army and air force or risk diminished respect and budgets, especially as war costs and sanctions rise.
The navy will want to maintain an aggressive role and stay closer to the shore than judiciousness calls for. That means frigates and cruisers going against attack helicopters and land-based platforms – expensive vessels against basic weapons. Attrition here favors Ukraine.
Wearing down the Russian navy in coming months will help Ukrainian counteroffensives along the coast. Russian forces will have diminishing and less forthright naval support around Kherson and Melitopol and Ukrainian forces will be better positioned to reduce supplies coming up from Crimea. The more Russian ships lost, the more Crimea is in jeopardy.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.