Brian M Downing
Russia’s Donbas offensive has failed to encircle Ukrainian units or make significant penetration. It’s made only limited gains around Lyman, Donetsk, and Severodonetsk. Ukrainian casualties, though, have been high – about a hundred dead per day on average and twice that amid exceptionally sharp fighting.
Russian casualties must be high as well, though Moscow is less forthcoming than Kyiv. Attacking forces ordinarily suffer much higher losses but Russia’s protracted artillery poundings might make that invalid here. Nonetheless, Russian advances in the easternmost area around Severodonetsk have met with determined resistance, gaining only about twenty kms in ten weeks – about 285 meters a day. Fitzgerald saw that sort of fighting:
See that little stream – we could walk to it in two minutes. It took the British a month to walk to it — a whole empire walking very slowly, dying in front and pushing forward behind. And another empire walked very slowly backward a few inches a day, leaving the dead like a million bloody rugs. (Tender is the Night, 1934)
The war has been stalemated for weeks now. Ukraine has superior troops and considerable foreign support. Russia has the larger population, economy, and army. Resources and time may favor Moscow. Kyiv needs to find innovative ways out of stalemate.
Guerrilla operations
The principal mission of US Special Forces in the 1950s was to train Europeans in guerrilla warfare in the event Soviet and WTO forces overran them. That never happened. However, over the last eight years Special Forces have trained Ukrainian troops in the expectation that Russian invaders would make swift advances in the impending war.
That didn’t happen either, except along the Black Sea coast east and west of the Crimean peninsula. Predictably, guerrilla operations are underway there, especially in occupied Kherson, Melitopol, and the coastal area between them. They will continue, probably in conjunction with counteroffensives to retake coastal cities and break the Russian landbridge.
Ukraine would do well to expand guerrilla fighting behind Russian positions in the Donbas. A small number of trained partisans can do considerable damage to ammo dumps, convoys, and refineries. This would unnerve rear echelons, divert troops from forward positions, and make it clear that advances open up more territory for guerrillas.
Inside Russia
Washington discourages attacking Russian territory, at least publicly. Given the nature and significance of the war, that’s inconducive to reasonable responses. One might suspect or hope that Washington is privately supportive of more forceful measures. The border isn’t a Yalu with hundreds of thousands of spirited volunteers massed across it. The other side has already crossed the line anyway. Bases inside Russia support ground operations, missile attacks, and air strikes, and have since the outset. Civilians are deliberately targeted, tortured, and executed. The war is the most important since the Second World War. The outcome will affect the future of NATO and democracies in Europe and Asia.
Ukraine has already struck inside Russia at least twice – helicopters attacked a depot in Belgorod and a drone hit a refinery near Rostov. Expanded attacks on strategic targets will make Russians feel costs from a heretofore distant war. They may also encourage opponents of the war to move from courageous peaceful protest to more decisive action. Disaffected Russian youth, after all, long ago invented the resolute cell determined to bring change. They killed a tsar in 1881.
Inside Belarus
Nominally neutral, Belarus has supported the war from the start. Drives on Kyiv and Kharkiv came from its territory and missiles and aircraft continue to come from there. Belarusian tanks and other equipment are being transferred to Russian units, either to resupply Donbas units or prepare for another offensive on Kyiv.
There are many legitimate targets inside Belarus. Roads and railways have already been hit, possibly by Ukrainian special forces or by Belarusians resentful of President Lukashenko’s reliance on Putin for internal repression after a rigged election. Ukrainian attacks could cause more trouble for Lukashenko. Most Belarusians don’t want involvement in the war but some may resume the anti-government activity that Lukashenko and Putin squashed a few years ago.
Putin might lean on his client in Minsk to support the war more forthrightly. Lukashenko talks belligerently but knows his army is small and drawn from largely unmotivated or even hostile conscripts. If ordered into Ukraine, the army would fare poorly. Parts might rebel and switch sides. Lukashenko would falter, Putin would shudder.
A few hundred Belarusian volunteers are already fighting Russians in Ukraine. They could be redeployed to the border with their homeland and imply a Free Belarus straddling both countries. Arms transfers to Russia might have to be halted. Putin would have to keep several BTGs in reserve. Repression could bring destabilizing opposition.
Losing Belarus might be more problematic than stalemate in Ukraine. It might even make the war untenable or pointless as it would mean another former SSR moving closer to the West.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.