Brian M Downing
It’s been clear for several years now that the neoconservatives want to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities and probably much of its military and infrastructure as well. The recent National Intelligence Estimate that concluded Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program several years ago seemed to have thwarted the plan. But when Admiral Fallon, who opposed such strikes, resigned last week as head of CENTCOM, speculation on such attacks naturally returned.
Fallon’s ouster might simply be a bluff to keep Iran from causing more trouble and more US casualties in Iraq, which will continue the illusion that the relative calm there has been engineered by General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency program, and does not stem, even in part, from Iranian policy. However, the prospect of a series of airstrikes later this year is real.
One of the few obstacles to attacking Iran has been the fear of losing large numbers of pilots and aircraft. Plans relied mainly on cruise missiles, whose relatively limited numbers (compared to bombs) presented limitations. Last September, however, Israel’s attack on a Syrian target of unclear nature made it obvious that the Russian-made air defense systems of Syria and Iran can be defeated and that neither country can prevent devastating airstrikes such as those Israel visited on Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Iran is vulnerable to American and Israeli airpower, and everyone knows it.
Paradoxically, Iranian coffers would benefit from airstrikes. Even though oil resources would likely be off limits, attacks would raise the price of oil at a rate making recent increases seem sluggish. Iran could, through an artillery battery or two deployed near the Straits of Hormuz, wield more influence on world prices than all of OPEC. And the world, including US allies, will not appreciate the energy surcharges suddenly brought on by American airpower.
How would the airstrikes figure in the presidential campaign? They could take place after the elections in early November, but the administration might calculate that the prospects of the GOP retaining the White House are dismal and that checking off another item off the neoconservative to-do list would have little political effect. Indeed, the administration might conclude that bombing Iran would increase John McCain’s chances this fall. A considerable portion of the public would look upon a few weeks of airstrikes on Iran as a welcome diversion from domestic discontent and a pleasant excitation of their fascination with power prestige. Other parts of the public will be outraged, but that too shall pass. Attention is far more focused on foreclosures, unemployment, and making ends meet. Congressional remonstrances too will be limited, as members of Congress, on both sides of the aisle, know well the influence of the think tanks and public affairs outfits that have long been urging, Delenda est Persiano.
Even the US cannot make Persia a desert, and no peace is in sight. Iran could retaliate by pressing Hisbollah to attack American and Israeli targets throughout the Middle East. Hisbollah’s ties to Shi’a political and military groups in Iraq could strengthen, as they began to do during Israel’s bombing campaign of Lebanon. Furthermore, Iran could ratchet up US casualties in Iraq by increasing its supplies to Shi’a militias, which have been relatively quiet since last fall, and by infiltrating its own special forces groups. Iran might also directly attack US forces offshore. Its missiles and aircraft might seek to overwhelm US air defenses, formidable though they are, through massive numbers and seek to hit an aircraft carrier. A question that must weigh heavily on naval commanders, though less so on the administration, is whether or not Iran has obtained supersonic anti-ship missiles from Russia or China – two nations that seek to garner influence in the region and reduce US influence there and elsewhere. The public’s reaction to losing an aircraft carrier, which has not happened since World War Two, would be profound horror and moral outrage followed by calls for vengeance.
There is one more consequence of bombing Iran, perhaps the one most carefully thought through by the neoconservatives. Attacking Iran would tie the hands of the next president, regardless of party, for the foreseeable future. While a meaningful rapprochement with Iran is unlikely under either an Obama or Clinton administration even without a previous attack on Iran, rapprochement would be inconceivable after military exchanges between the US and Iran.
Again, Fallon’s ouster could be part of a bluff to keep Iran from upping its weapons shipments into Iraq. In this respect it might be akin to the threat of using tactical nuclear weapons on the research centers buried beneath layers of rock near Natanz and in mountainsides near Isfahan. But the Bush administration has little if anything to lose, and it could ensure lasting bitter enmity between the US and Iran, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. And in that respect, neo-conservatism would shape US Middle Eastern policy long after it is out of government.
©2008 Brian M Downing