Another fighting season in Afghanistan – and perhaps a decisive one
Brian M Downing
The Afghan war is seasonal. Fighting begins in the spring and relents in the early winter, though warmer weather this year protracted the fighting. Last year was the Taliban’s best showing in years. It demonstrated surprising effectiveness in the northern province of Kunduz, seizing control of its capital for a few days until special forces were airlifted in to retake it. The Taliban also launched offensives in the south and east, cutting off many provinces from the capital, at least temporarily.
Throughout much of the mild winter an offensive continued in the southern province of Helmand. District after district has fallen and the capital, Lashkar Gah, is beleaguered. The coming offensive will bring tremendous strain on the Afghan army. It will also likely bring greater western intervention.
The 2016 offensive
The Taliban must be greatly encouraged by successes over the last year. They likely feel capable of taking all of Helmand and many districts in Kandahar to the east, and also gain ground in the north and east, around Kabul.
Last year saw offensives in the north, south, and east, but not coordinated ones. This allowed the Afghan army (ANA) to bring in its best troops to blunt the drives.
Surely, the Taliban realize now that the bulk of the ANA does not fight very well. They will also realize that the best Afghan troops, its special forces, took heavy casualties last year and are still recuperating. Coordinated pushes in three or more provinces may overtax ANA special forces, and possibly break them.
The offensive’s strategic goals
The Taliban wants to take a number of provincial capitals – they presently hold none – and establish a strong position in negotiations at the close of the fighting season. They may take Lashkar Gah in coming weeks and press on for Kandahar city. Kunduz in the north and cities on the approaches to Kabul are vulnerable.
These ambitions are relatively modest. The success of the 2015 campaigns may have brought headiness to the new leadership. They may be convinced that the ANA is worn down and facing increased desertion. The Kabul government is as corrupt as ever and the Afghan public is increasingly opposed to it.
The public may also be judged to be increasingly, if reluctantly, accepting of Taliban rule, which after all is honest compared to that of Kabul. As Bernard Fall noted long ago, a government losing an insurgency isn’t simply being out-fought, it’s being out-governed.
The Taliban, or at least an important bloc in its riling shura, may feel that victory is at hand. The view may be based on religious sentiment as much as military analysis.
The response
It has become clear that efforts to build an effective army in Afghanistan has yielded only a few determined battalions. The rest are plagued by ethnic tensions and incompetent officers for whom few troops will risk their lives.
It was thought that the numerically superior but less effective ANA would be able to continue the essentially stalemated war, especially with the continued help of western airpower. This, however, is no longer probable.
Late last year, reports surfaced that American special forces units were fighting in the south. British ground troops have undoubtedly redeployed into Afghanistan. As the 2016 offensive builds in coming months or weeks, the US and UK will likely take up a portion of ground combat, perhaps acting as reaction forces to bolster failing ANA positions and inflict punishing casualties on concentrated Taliban forces.
A bolder scenario would be for ANA and western forces to strike into Taliban-held districts where logistical hubs and command centers are located. Still bolder would be series into Taliban sanctuaries across the frontier where they enjoy the support of the Pakistani army.
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In coming months, Kabul will lose control over more swathes of territory. It will also face a weaker bargaining position in future talks, and perhaps be on the verge of military disintegration. Western troops may be required to blunt the coming Taliban offensive and establish a stronger position in future negotiations.
Paradoxically, this is what the Russian intervention in Syria accomplished over the last six months.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.