Brian M Downing
The 2001 al Qaeda attacks called for a forceful response. The US response was forceful but poorly thought out and unsuccessful. Trying to occupy and modernize a landlocked, traditional country comprising scores of mutually antagonistic groups and surrounded by unreliable countries, was an appalling, foreseeable blunder.
My thought at the time was to interdict al Qaeda finances and kill its personnel wherever they could be found. Foreign intelligence services would assist with either information or assassins. There were former KGB operatives seeking work back then, many had long experience in the trade. Payments for services rendered would be made swiftly.
The idea of invading Afghanistan seemed far-fetched and unfeasible. No one in Washington would be so foolish, but they were. It was not the only response. It was simply the one the White House and Pentagon went with.
The politics
Washington wanted an immediate forceful response, one that demonstrated American might and resolve. The public, unexpectedly united and more eager for war than anytime since Pearl Harbor, asked for no strategic plan. They too wanted an immediate display of might.
The plan soon went into effect. US special forces linked up with Northern Alliance troops and drove the Taliban out of the country. Americans rejoiced. “Kabul is ours,” I mordantly said to a WW2 veteran and longtime correspondent. “I don’t want it,” came his somber reply.
Early in the campaign, before forces drove into the south, there seemed to be a glimmer of a strategic vision. Our side would surely hold back from taking the whole country. They would engage Taliban, al Qaeda, and Pakistani forces along a long front, ensnare them in no-win situation, and keep them there. But as the forces drove south, the glimmer vanished. It could have been done smarter.
The war
By remaining in the north and keeping up military pressure, our forces would have put Taliban and allied forces in a hopeless position. They would have to defend the south and would have to do so in a conventional war of infantry, armor, and air assets. That’s our forte, that’s their weakness.
We used superior weaponry to defeat enemies. It was used to good effect ten years earlier when it destroyed the Iraqi army in a few days. The Taliban side was spirited but lightly-armed and only indifferently trained. Their losses would be high and difficult to replace – more so as the fighting went on.
The US side should never have defeated the Taliban completely and seized the south. That was a blunder. Instead, we should have stayed in the north and relentlessly worn the enemy down. No truce, no ceasefire. No Kabul, no Kandahar. No long occupation, no humiliating end two decades later.
The outcomes
At some point, perhaps only after a few months, US and Northern Alliance forces would have inflicted severe costs. Taliban, al,Qaeda, and Pakistani Frontier Corps troops would have lost combat effectiveness from high casualties, sagging morale, and widespread desertion.
The Taliban would have three options.
1. Retreat to the Pashtun heartland around Kandahar and Helmand and continue the fight.
Northern Forces would not have to pursue. They could consolidate in the north, militarily and politically, and leave a weakened enemy in the south. Ground troops could launch destructive raids there and US air strikes would continue to pound them.
2. Resort to guerrilla warfare behind Northern lines. Hit and run.
The north was not hospitable to the Pashtuns or the Taliban. Infiltration would be costly, local cooperation negligible, and Taliban forces further depleted.
3. Negotiate a settlement to prevent disintegration and hold on to something.
The US would insist on handing over or executing Osama bin Laden, ending al Qaeda’s presence one way or another, and ordering Pakistani Frontier Corps units south of the Durand Line. The US and the Northern Alliance would refrain from further campaigns in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
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The war we got led to twenty years of fighting, large US and NATO deployments (over 100,000 at times), tremendous expenditures, and humiliating defeat. The alternative war would have led at the very least to a stable stalemate that put the Taliban on the back foot and in danger of collapse. It would have cost relatively little and required only a few thousand Western troops. Russia and Iran, who feared Sunni militancy, would have supported the US, as they did for many years after 2001.
The two powers might also have supported the North’s political and economic stability. In a few years US troop levels could be negligible or withdrawn altogether. We would not have had Kabul, but we would have dignity.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.