Brian M Downing
IS-K, heretofore a small network of Pakistani Pashtuns and a miscellany of foreign jihadis, is now taking in former Afghan army soldiers. The view here has been that tens of thousands of ANA veterans are eager to regain the honor they lost in the ignominious collapse last summer and want vengeance on the Taliban – but independent of IS-K. However, reports indicate that veterans are joining the Islamist band in eastern Afghanistan. Numbers at present are small but the dynamic is interesting.
Why are former soldiers joining IS-K and what might it augur?
Motivations
One possibility is that veterans have reacted to defeat and dishonor by embracing austere religion. They may attribute the debacle to lack of devotion to the Prophet and his teachings – a recurring theme in the military history of the Islamic world. The Iraqi army was devastated in the First Guif War (1991) and many soldiers turned to Salafi teachings. Similarly, austere forms of Islam spread in the Egyptian army after the Six-Day War (1967). Going back deeper into the past, Wahhabi and Almoravid armies benefited from zeal for restored honor and conquest. Indeed, Islamist militancy today draws on resentments from decades of failures against Western and Israeli armies.
This dynamic may be present in the ANA soldiers attraction to IS-K but isn’t likely to be widespread, at least not yet. More likely soldiers see the jihadi group in more practical terms. It can help the former soldiers regain honor and challenge the Taliban. The caliphate holds no appeal.
Effectiveness
IS-K will be wary of newcomers who do not display proper religious devotion. The leaders will be concerned that the soldiers will become too numerous, eventually get the upper hand, and drain the movement of its ardor and international ambitions. Tensions will abound between the zealous and the practical, between established leaders and better-skilled newcomers, and between those eager to bomb civilian targets and those not.
These tensions may limit the effectiveness of the veteran-infused band or prevent meaningful cooperation at all. However, if cooperation prevails, IS-K will pose a far more serious challenge to the Taliban.
IS-K fighters are zealous, knowledgeable of light weapons, and willing to face death. But they’re untrained in basic military discipline and tactics. That’s what ANA troops bring. They have been trained in and have used small-unit maneuvers and defenses. Though not great soldiers for the most part, they can improve IS-K’s fighting abilities.
IS-K brings a network of cells, iron dedication, and formidable small-unit cohesion based on shared faith. It also has reliable sources of arms and finances, mainly from smuggling and wealthy sympathizers in Pakistan and the Gulf.
An IS-K/ANA force can better defend mountainous redoubts in eastern Afghanistan. Taliban ground attacks may be costly and inconclusive. IS-K/ANA can make the transition from a shadowy network of bombers to an insurgency with a measure of support from locals. IS-K alone is unlikely to get that.
IS-K/ANA successes will encourage thousands of other veterans to join or form non-aligned cells in various parts of the country, especially the non-Pashtun north. (This is likely to occur without IS-K/ANA efforts. The Taliban will be forced to spread themselves thin and perhaps exact vicious reprisals on locals. This in turn will strengthen hostility toward the Taliban and build support for various opposition groups.
© 2021Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.