Violence in Israel and the West Bank has picked up since late last summer. In recent weeks, casualties have gone up markedly, and ominously. Most troubling is the turmoil centering at the Temple Mount, or Noble Sanctuary as it’s known in Islam. A Third Intifada may be in the offing. The region is already beset by civil war and Islamist militancy and foreign interventions. Another Intifada will make it even more dangerous.
Trouble in Sunni states
Saudi Arabia and the other Sunni principalities will be angered by another uprising, as it will be deeply embarrassing. Sunni statesmen have long remonstrated about the Palestinian cause but refrained from firm action. There have been only modest subsidies from expansive coffers to relief agencies and reconstruction projects.
Sunni publics are keenly aware of their leaders’ inaction and also of their hypocrisies – trading with the US and relying on it for defense, and aligning with Israel against Iran. An Intifada may cause tumult in countries with restive youths for whom the plight of fellow Muslims is more important than sectarian hatreds and deference to elites.
All this comes not long after reform movements were quashed by security forces, and as an aged clique attempts to pass the mantle to a younger one that shares its hatreds and priorities. The restiveness in the public is almost certainly found inside the armed forces as well, where competent middle-grade officers must defer to less qualified scions of a handful of families.
A boon for Iran
Unrest in the Sunni monarchies will naturally be welcome in Iran, all the more so because Tehran has been highly vocal in denouncing the oppression of Palestinians and the inaction of Sunni princes. Tehran’s support for Hamas and Hisbollah has been noted in the region. The former has withstood Israel’s punitive campaigns, the latter has worn down its army and forced it to retreat from Lebanon – a rare and much trumpeted victory.
Iran is positioned to encourage unrest inside Sunni monarchies by underscoring their relations with the US and Israel, and by calling upon Shia clerics to press for immediate change – inexpensive and portentous moves. State after state in the Middle East has disintegrated in recent years. If Saudi Arabia were to follow suit, it would be most welcome – not only in Iran but also in Israel, which would prefer to have friendly countries around it, but would settle for weak, fragmented ones.
A boon for ISIL and al Qaeda
Reduced legitimacy in Sunni monarchies, and increased anger among Palestinians, will magnify the attraction of jihadi ideology. With the two-state solution receding into irrelevance, confidence in the Palestinian Authority will decline and possibly collapse. The path of jihad will appear to many, in Palestine and the region, as an attractive option and perhaps as the only remaining one.
The call will be louder owing to ongoing strife around the Noble Sanctuary where the rules governing prayer are being challenged. Islamic apocalyptic texts, which are enjoying great popularity in recent years, have luridly described dangers to the Noble Sanctuary and to the al Aqsa mosque atop it. An anti-Christ-like figure will endanger it; the faithful will rally to its defense and bring about the final battle. In some texts the battle takes place just to the east, in Damascus.
ISIL and kindred groups will try to establish networks inside Israel, solidify strongholds in Sinai and Syria, form new fighting groups in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and call upon more lone wolf attacks throughout the West.
Egypt
Syria, Iraq, and Libya have broken into several warring pieces. Lebanon has been that way for years. None is likely to be unified and able to field an effective army for the foreseeable future.
Egypt, however, is reasonably coherent. Its army is unified and effective, well financed from abroad, and in control of most of the country. The generals brood over past defeats at the hands of the Israel army and over former President Mubarak’s obeisance to Washington.
Revanchism is rife, but opportunity is scant. In previous wars, Egypt had allies to the east – Syria, Jordan, and to some extent Iraq. Allies could not ensure success in previous wars, and are of no use today. Egypt alone is no match for the IDF and will not risk its devastation in a futile gesture of faith and defiance.
Further, Cairo is losing control of parts of eastern Sinai to bedouins and al Qaeda. Israeli security bureaus may find them capable of blowing up pipelines and occasionally launching border raids. However, they are of no threat to the nation. In the convoluted power relations of a disintegrating region, the Sinai bands may be reluctantly accepted as a worrisome but useful buffer between Israel and the only effective army along its borders.
©2015 Brian M Downing