Brian M Downing
In October of last year, Hamas attacked Israel. Iran planned the surprising and murderous sortie and soon enough its Hisbollah and Houthi allies entered the fray. The aim was to avenge Israeli assassinations and acts of sabotage but more importantly to ensnarl its enemy in harsh urban combat in Gaza, protracted clashes in Lebanon, and aerial exchanges with Yemen. This would turn publics against Israel. Arab publics would be irate, as would many of their leaders. Emerging economic and strategic partnerships would be imperiled.
However, intense regional responses against Israel never materialized. Public ire came and went. Criticisms were measured and only occasional. Israel is leveling Gaza, Hamas has been all but annihilated. Hisbollah’s leadership has been killed off and its rank and file crippled. The Houthis know what’s on the way and might well ease off.
The most serious blow fell in Syria. Turkey and its proxies saw Hisbollah weak from years of war and recent Israeli attacks, and decided to strike for Damascus. Assad’s army fell back then fell apart. Iran’s senior commanders fled and Assad followed suit. Moscow showed its unreliability and Tehran lost its only regional ally. Iran is in its worst position since the war with Iraq. What to do?
The new Syria
Iran is seeking to maintain ties with HTS-led Syria. It can offer money for reconstruction. The country is in a shambles and while Turkey, the Sunni princes, and the West will send money, Iranian funds might be useful. Tehran has already expressed a common enmity toward Israel. Turkey, HTS’s chief backer, shares that view as well.
This isn’t promising. Though Damascus might cash Tehran’s checks, Iran was responsible for troops and mercenaries that kept Assad in power and killed thousands of soldiers and civilians. Syrians loathe Shia Iran on religious grounds too. Even if cordial ties somehow came about, they wouldn’t increase Iran’s security.
China
Iran sells huge amounts of oil and gas to China and has opened its markets to Chinese goods. China wants to gain influence in the Gulf and indeed one day replace the US as the region’s arms supplier and guarantor of security – a new Twin Pillars as it was called in the days before the Khomeini revolution.
China is a growing economic and diplomatic state but at present it cannot project power outside east Asia, let alone into the Gulf. It has plans to do just that. It cannot have truly secure energy supplies until the US is out. That day is not at hand.
Rapprochement with the Saudis
Sectarian tensions reach back centuries but after World War Two they were held in check by America’s presence and oil imports from both sides. That ended with Khomeini, the embassy seizure, and regional fears of Shia expansionism. Time has eased sectarian hostilities and China began a reconciliation dialog. It buys oil and gas from both sides, sells arms to both, and notes the mutual benefits of developing within its sphere.
The Saudis might see Iran’s disasters in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria as presenting an opportunity to humble Iran. That would be an important step in the direction of a new era of Saudi preeminence from the Maghreb to Pakistan. The thought must be crossing the mind of the young ambitious Mohammad bin Salman.
However, Sunni armies in the Gulf are incapable of delivering a serious blow to Iran. The Saudi and Emirati armies are unprofessional and weakened by nepotism. Iranian forces didn’t fare well in the Syrian war but they’re nonetheless better trained and led. They also have combat experience and would be fighting from defensive positions in their own soil.
The princes might hope that Trump will do their dirty work. Netanyahu will certainly urge him to do just that. Trump, however, never showed any willingness to attack Iran in his first term. He ordered airstrikes but called the planes back.
The nuclear option
Iran would have less fear of attack if it had nuclear weapons. National security would be assured. Had Saddam had them he’d be in Baghdad today. Nuclear weapons would also bring prestige abroad and support at home – dual attractions after the Syrian debacle.
France developed nuclear weapons after losing Indochina and Algeria. Pakistan did the same after defeats at the hands of India. N Koreans are thrilled at their leader’s weapons programs. Every IRGC general knows this. They also see doddering clerics running the country who are long on sacred texts but short on realpolitik. Nuclear weapons would win popular support and move the country toward IRGC controlling the country with the clerics reduced to a supporting role.
Iran has been enriching uranium speedily since the US abandoned the nuclear treaty. It’s almost certainly been working on a trigger mechanism. Signs of an imminent deliverable weapon might strengthen the IRGC and cheer the public but it would be disastrous. The US, Israel, and Britain would strike hard. Rapprochement with the Saudis would end. And China would see plans for regional hegemony go up in smoke. Beijing might move away from Iran and align with the Sunnis. That would demonstrate to the world the consequences of defying China.
Rapprochement isn’t the boldest option but it is the most promising one, though perhaps not from an Iranian general’s point of view.
©2024 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.