Brian M Downing
The Ukraine war has gone badly for Russia. This isn’t widely admitted in Moscow, especially in the upper echelons. Russia’s response hasn’t been to reform its inept army, as did Prussia amid the Napoleonic wars and Japan against western imperialism. Putin et al aren’t looking to the future for a modern fighting force, they’re looking to the past for a venerable winning formula.
The formula is of course drawn from World War Two when Stalin built an immense army, pointed to the imperiled motherland, and hurled troops relentlessly and unsparingly against western invaders. He pushed the enemy from the gates of Moscow and eventually and at heavy cost took Berlin. His indirect successor is seeking to repeat that formula and restore greatness.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of Putin’s rapidly-assembled, nationalistically-inspired army?
Perceived advantages
Quantity, as often noted, has a quality of its own. This is especially so of troops motivated and united by nationalist ardor. Russia, through conscripts, recruits, mercenaries, and convicts, has significantly increased the size of its army inside Ukraine. They have all been indoctrinated with warnings of a nation imperiled and memories of past glory. They look around their camps and see hundreds of similarly motivated soldiers and sense tradition, power, and inevitable victory.
An historical analogy, one that may be serving as template and inspiration to Moscow, is the determined, even frenzied assaults of the Great Patriotic War. Accounts of the Russian push across the Vistula River in 1945, for example, note relentless artillery pounding and the fervor and abandon of ground troops as they surged forward. The Germans, though entrenched, experienced, and well-equipped, could not hold the left bank. Nor could they hold anything else. Determined attacks continued down the road to Berlin.
Invoking past glories and instilling a deeply nationalistic almost dervish-like spirit are intended to boost sagging morale, compensate for flaws, and turn the tide. In a country where memories of World War Two remain incandescent, it’s working for now. Mass infantry attacks across open fields around Bakhmut have been continuous for several months. Assault groups include regular troops, airborne units, Mobiks, and convicts, disparate groups – all driven by nationalist appeals. The losses are immense, but on they come.
Expected outcomes
The Kremlin expects the offensive to take control of all Donetsk and Luhansk and solidify control of Crimea and the land bridge. This would likely lead to a strategic pause before another offensive to finish off Ukrainian resistance. The spirited assault across the Vistula in 1945, it’s hoped, will be matched by one across the Dnipro.
Success is intended to convince the world that the Russian army, now strengthened by numbers and fervor, cannot be stopped. The West will see support as pointless. NATO’s resolve will decline will fissures will return. States along on the Russian periphery will become more respectful, if not deferent.
Disquiet in army and state will ease. Putin’s control will be undisputed and his place in the august national pantheon alongside Peter and Stalin will be assured. The populace will be all the more fawning.
China must be deeply disappointed in its only major ally. With a turn of events in Ukraine, Putin will impress upon Xi that he is an invaluable partner in the momentous project of weakening the United States and ushering in a new world order.
The view here has long been that the Russian army was deeply flawed from the start and was nearing paralysis. Enjoying the appeal of historical precedent and echelons of nodding heads, Putin’s expansion and indoctrination has buoyed the army. However, it has gained little ground. An army built upon quantity over quality and ardor over training has critical disadvantages. They will be explored next.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.