Brian M Downing
Russia is planning a major offensive this spring. It’s drafting hundreds of thousands more men, sending considerable amounts of materiel to rear areas, and pressuring Belarus to enter the war. Putin has even appointed a new commander for the new operations in Ukraine – his loyal army chief of staff Valery Gerasimov. He’s long on loyalty, short on professionalism.
After a year of failure, it’s puzzling that Moscow would have confidence in a new major operation. What notions, ideologies, and concerns are behind the plan and what are the offensive’s prospects for success?
Official ideology
Putin isn’t a statesman with broad education and experience. He’s a vengeful KGB officer passionately determined to assert personal power and reassert Stalin’s empire. That has shaped his outlooks since communism fell. Isolation since the defeats of last spring has brought neither reassessment by Putin nor candor from his coterie.
Putin, his loyalists, and most of the public are convinced that though the war has not gone as planned, Russia’s artillery, missiles, and ground attacks have inflicted heavy casualties and weakened morale. The battle for Bakhmut, deemed pointless outside Russia, is opening the way for a much larger campaign that will cause enemy positions to give way. Ukraine’s smaller population and economy will do the same.
Russian troops have recovered from disappointments and hundreds of thousands of fresh, determined conscripts are marching in. Now that the nation sees the war is with western states, the spirit that persevered and won against the Third Reich has been stirred. It will see that Russia emerges from this war as it did the one Stalin led.
Russian cant goes on and on. Western states lack Russia’s national unity, moral fiber, and long history of suffering and persevering until victory, which stretches back to wars with the Mongols, Teutonic Knights, Swedes, French, and Germans. The spring offensive will prove Russia’s mettle and its enemies’ frailty. The West is in moral and political decline. Its publics know nothing of war and endurance, only affluence and indulgence. They will soon tire of hardship and reduce support to Kyiv. History is on Russia’s side – or so it goes.
Unofficial concern
Behind Russia’s blustery ideology lies a more sober assessment. Moscow knows it faces two internal threats. Hardcore nationalists, at the elite and public levels, see the nation imperiled. They want firmer action and signs of success, if not victory. Prominent here are the increasingly powerful Wagner Group and other mercenary forces, airborne and special forces units, military bloggers, and popular media figures.
Furthermore, large portions of the public may become weary of stalemate for another year and suspicious of casualty figures which differ from rumor and common sense. Flagging popular support may cause stronger resistance to conscription, more acts of arson, and the need to allocate resources away from the war to prevent turmoil.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.