Brian M Downing
Putin’s army has been defeated at Kyiv, the Donbas, Kharkiv, and now Kherson. It’s no longer capable of offensive operations and may be incapable of holding anywhere along the expansive but receding front. Russia will be fortunate if winter halts Ukrainian operations. Either way, the Russian army is heading for disaster, perhaps collapse.
The flaws
The view here, from war’s outset, was that the Russian army was deeply flawed and would perform poorly. Nothing has contradicted this assessment. The army lacks unit cohesion and training, relies on harsh discipline rather than camaraderie, fields poorly-made equipment, has no NCOs between officers and troops, and suffers from a corrupt, sycophantic officer corps from BTG headquarters to Moscow bureaus.
The army that invaded Ukraine was an undisciplined horde eager for glory and loot and credulous of generals and politicians. In the course of battle it has failed to improve, discipline has deteriorated, and casualties have been staggering. It’s losing ground – sometimes rapidly, sometimes slowly, but always at great cost.
The mobilization
Despite high losses, Putin was reluctant to delve deep into the draft or call for mobilization for fear of undermining his boasts that the war was proceeding well. Last month, however, he mobilized some 300,000 men. It’s not going well.
Resistance was significant before and after induction. The army doesn’t have the resources to train, equip, and motivate a large number of Mobiks. They’re increasingly restive at base camps and are being sent south and tossed into combat after only a week or two. They are not given the benefit of beginning at ghost fronts. Instead they’re sent to heavily contested areas like Kherson and the Donbas.
It’s a dark secret that new troops, in any army, are often used in dangerous situations. Hardened veterans resent newbies and order them on reconnaissance patrols and into exposed positions. If they survive, they’re more experienced and useful. If not, comrades survive and more Mobiks will arrive soon. Either way, combat effectiveness is maintained or even strengthened.
This naturally causes or exacerbates Mobik animosity toward veterans. They’re even more likely to refuse orders, desert, and create disciplinary trouble. Hostility goes the other way as well. Veterans are irked that poorly-trained and ill-equipped replacements are sent in to replenish their ranks and bolster their spirits before going back into the meat grinder.
The Russian army is unable to meet manpower requirements. Mobiks are probably weakening unit cohesion and combat effectiveness. Discipline, morale, and infighting will worsen in coming months. Most Wehrmacht units, despite heavy casualties and repeated defeats, remained effective until the spring of ‘45. But they had unit cohesion, able NCOs and officers, and decent though beleaguered supply lines. The Russians don’t have any of this, and never did. Some units may break from already frail command structures and refuse orders, surrender, or degenerate into frenzied pillage and rape as long as they can.
Another mobilization program may begin soon. Nothing has changed to make it more useful than its predecessor.
The winter
Cold and snow will soon sweep across the steppes, affecting both sides. Trucks and wheeled self-propelled guns are already getting stuck. Mud causes armor tracks to slide off. (It’s a chore putting them back on, as I learned safely at Fort Knox long ago.) However, winter is harder on the side with weaker morale and supply lines – Russia.
Weather will hamper or delay Ukrainian drives, especially on the land bridge. Kyiv can nonetheless use raids, drones, artillery, and guerrilla operations behind the lines to continue attrition, interdict supplies, and deny respite along the large U-shaped front. Russian positions may bend then disintegrate, opening the way for swift Ukrainian advances.
Putin can avoid disintegration only by withdrawing from Ukrainian territory. This won’t happen. it would admit defeat, embolden opposition, and perhaps bring his downfall. His amateurish intransigence may bring his army down by spring.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.