Brian M Downing
Putin, facing dire manpower problems in Ukraine, has ordered mobilization of 300,000 reservists. It sounds more formidable than it is. Few reservists have anything more than basic training, which in Russia is cursory and almost meaningless.
Industry can’t adequately equip them. The army doesn’t have cadres to train them. As Karl Marx once asked, who will teach the teachers. Trainers can only be put in place by taking them off the lines.
Mobilization indicates that casualties have been high, official statements false, and ordinary recruitment paltry. Resistance is breaking out in the public and soldiers on the frontlines face further morale problems.
Russian casualties
Putin would not have tried oblast-level recruitment and now mobilization if the army had not taken heavy casualties. Official numbers aren’t forthcoming. Inquiries by concerned parents are ignored or silenced by warnings.
American intelligence puts Russian battle deaths at 15,000. Ukraine puts the figure at about 57,000. The fighting around Kyiv, Mariupol, the Donbas, Kherson, and Kharkiv was fierce, giving credence to estimates much higher than the CIA’s. Putin’s urgency strengthens that credence.
Official statements
The mobilization order undermines seven months of assurances. The public, parts of it anyway, are waking up. The special operation is not going well. It’s a large war that now requires the first mobilization since World War Two. Official casualty figures, when given, must be appallingly low. The Kremlin put the losses from the Moskva loss at one sailor killed, twenty-seven missing. Rumors of much higher losses and command failures circulate among the crew’s families.
If the Kremlin has lied about progress and deaths, what else has it hidden? Can it be trusted about the supposed threat posed by Ukraine before the war? What of the prospects of turning the tide with fresh troops? Grim reports from veterans of ineptitude and death have had little impact so far. They may have more now.
Resistance
The view here has been that the war is widely supported owing to its resonance with the Great Patriotic War, which has been central to official presentations. Supporting the war while safe abed is quite different from hefting a Kalashnikov in the steppes. Attached to the realization of official lies is the prospect of being pulled from civilian comforts and sent into forward positions. They could be there by November.
The war has already brought unexplained fires at defense-related sites, occasional attacks on police stations and induction centers, and silent street protests. The mobilization call has brought fierce protest in many cities. They draw strength from the global context of energized youth opposing the status quo. Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons brings further alarm as young urban dwellers know what US retaliation would mean. Some have an idea of the quality of their military equipment, including air defenses.
Opposition is courageous and passionate but it isn’t all Russia and it doesn’t signal Putin’s fall. We do not see regime support in working-class districts and vast rural areas. Putin’s repressive capacity remains strong.
Troops in the field
Initially, the army performed dismally. Leadership, logistics, and cohesion were poor. There was improvement during the Donbas offensive. Soldiers were moving forward and inflicting vengeance. The offensive petered out. Gains were slight, casualties high. Stalemate and attrition returned.
Then the Ukrainian counteroffensive led to disarray and flight around Kharkiv. Hundreds of armored vehicles and trucks were abandoned. Tens of thousands of troops west of the Dnipro are isolated and face annihilation.
Troops in the field know the manpower needs better than any general or politician. Images of faltering support back home reach them and send gut punches. Contracts mean nothing now; soldiers face indefinite hardships. Few believe they will return victorious. They’re more likely to come home on their shields.
In coming months their depleted ranks will be filled, if partly, by poorly-trained newbies of varying motivation and dubious reliability. They will be burdens who weaken cohesion and effectiveness. Their presence will cause anger, resentment, and as winter comes, further deterioration.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.