Brian M Downing
Eleven weeks ago Russia withdrew from Kyiv and focused on the east. Attempts at decisive breakthroughs failed and a slow, grinding war of attrition has emerged. Territorial changes have been small, casualties high. Neither side gives detailed casualty figures.
The Russian army has shown marked improvement since early debacles. It has advanced systematically though only very slowly as Ukrainian troops fight a defense in depth. Why are Russian troops performing better and what’s the significance of the offensive, on front positions and in Russia?
The Russian army
The invading BTGs were poorly trained, ill-disciplined, and ineptly led. Soldiers didn’t trust the guys around them or the officers above them. That precludes cohesion and effectiveness – and it showed around Kyiv and Kharkiv. Things have improved. Officers better understand basic tactics of using infantry and armor concertedly. Logistical forces have learned and now get the materiel to front positions. Military doctrines since World War Two stressed heavy artillery and they’re being used.
Ground units early on were driven by the promise of glory, pillage, and quick victory. That’s not much and many BTGs were torn to pieces. Morale and discipline suffered. Defeat loomed. Armies of World War One, on both sides, had the same naive expectations and saw them perish on the Marne and at Tannenberg. They accepted a new, long war. What happened with the Russians in Ukraine?
The state is presenting the war to soldiers in a new light. It will be long and arduous, like the Great Patriotic War in which forebears served. The fight is against ideological descendants of the Nazi invaders of 1941 and Western allies. The war promises to restore the imperial grandeur that Stalin won – a glimmering trophy in working-class and rural areas.
Ideological motivations, however, ring hollow after months of fighting and casualties. More important to the better performance is improved unit cohesion. Combat units that seemed on the verge of severe morale and disciplinary trouble, have coalesced into effective fighting forces. They weren’t trained for war while in Russia, but they adapted on the roads and steppes of Ukraine. They had to trust and work with one another or be killed by a better organized, more determined enemy. Cohesion prevailed over disintegration.
It’s difficult to determine how widespread the new cohesiveness is. Some units are always better than others and not every soldier responds well to hard experiences. Nor is it clear the tempo can continue. After all, advances in the Donbas have been small and costly. Many soldiers look around at depleted ranks and realize the 25 kilometers they’ve taken since April came at a steep price – and Kyiv is far away.
Back home
Limited success in the east has probably strengthened Putin domestically. Two months ago the army neared paralysis but now with its flags over a few towns, the Kremlin points with pride (and exaggeration) to progress. The army has the situation under control and victory is assured. So it goes.
The officer corps and state were restive in March. Western intelligence believes there was a failed coup not long after the invasion. Disquiet has waned, though Putin continues to sack generals and more oligarchs have died violently. The moves may not reflect actual opposition, only Putin’s will to rule through fear.
The view here is that the public supports the war and won’t pose meaningful opposition in the near future. Most Russians have been buoyed by scenes of their troops cheering amid vanquished riots of villages and towns. The tide has been turned, as at Stalingrad in ‘43.
The public doesn’t know the casualties and isn’t likely to. This may eventually present problems as casualties will stay high for months to come. Russia is refusing to accept corpses from the Ukrainians. Casualties cannot be hidden for long and rumors are swirling already, especially about the Moskva crew. The public will accept high casualties but lies about the fate of loved ones in uniform violates an implicit trust.
Putin is nonetheless reluctant to mobilize for war, especially by deeper draft levies. That would undermine the official line of being in control, increase whispers about the death toll, cause further fiscal trouble, and increase prospects of opposition. It’s one thing to cheer on the war while safely abed in cities, quite another to be under heavy fire on the Ukrainian steppes.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.