Severodonetsk and Kherson 

Brian M Downing  

Russia’s Donbas offensive failed in a major encirclement operation from Izyum in the north and Donetsk in the south. Moscow fell back on a less ambitious campaign of slowly moving west from the center of the Donbas. This, it is hoped, will solidify control of the region, grind down Ukraine’s soldiers and resolve, and bring victory. 

So far the results have been largely confined to the center of the Donbas. A battle, perhaps the fiercest of the war, is underway for the town of Severodonetsk. The Ukrainians are launching an offensive of their own far away, near Kherson at the western edge of the land bridge.  It will present the Russians with a dilemma.

Severodonetsk

The Russian advance in central Donbas has shown greater determination and professionalism than anything seen thus far. This is probably attributable to allocating the best troops and more artillery units to the effort. (If so, other units are the weaker for it.) The attack on Severodonetsk is complemented by attempts to encircle Ukrainian defenders from the north and south. This, Russia hopes, will trap a sizable force or require it to pull back, perhaps chaotically.    

Ukrainian forces are still fighting in Severodonetsk and blunting Russian encirclement efforts. Ukraine is fighting street by street, giving up a block here and there, but making the Russians pay heavily. 

The battle of Severodonetsk parallels in some respects the one for Mariupol, which lasted close to three months and almost certainly cost Russia several thousand casualties. Unlike Mariupol, however, Severodonetsk can be reinforced, resupplied, and backed by artillery and drones.

Russia may be turned back or bogged down in protracted urban fighting. Alternately, Ukrainian forces may withdraw to the next line of defense and fight from there as doggedly as in Severodonetsk – a defense in depth. Russia will have lost a substantial portion of its most effective troops, reign over an expanse of ruins it made, and plod on to the next fortified town a few kilometers down the road.

Kherson 

Early in the war Russian troops struck quickly from the Crimea and seized Kherson, roughly halfway between the peninsula and the Black Sea port of Odessa. The largest city in enemy hands, Kherson leads to Odessa and Transniester, both essential to Moscow’s plans for a land bridge and total conquest. 

A Ukrainian counteroffensive drove to within ten miles of Kherson before reaching formidable defenses. An effort along the Dnipro River, about fifty miles northeast of Kherson, has met with success, threatening Kherson and the land bridge as well. A further push east could isolate Crimea, all the more so with newly-arrived anti-ship missiles.

Guerrilla activity has picked up inside Kherson, so much so that a planned Russian referendum has been cancelled. Troops will have to be pulled from forward positions. Guerrilla forces are at work along the land bridge from Kherson to Melitopol.

The dilemma

Ukrainian successes near Kherson will present Moscow with a dilemma. Without more troops, Russia’s control of the western land bridge will be imperiled. Reinforcements can only come from the Donbas. That would weaken positions there and in time perhaps force retreats from Severodonetsk, Lyman, and Izyum. Reinforcements sent along the land bridge would be relentlessly attacked by guerrillas. Convoys will be hit, bridges blown, troops depleted. 

A choice between pressing ahead in the Donbas and defending the land bridge may loom. An outsider might assess the land bridge as more vital to Moscow than incremental gains in the Donbas. However, misinformation up and down the chain of command may prevent Moscow from properly assessing the situation, until late in the day.

From Kyiv’s perspective, ceding small amounts of territory in the east,  while breaking down Russia’s land bridge in the south, might be acceptable or even desirable. Inasmuch as the Russian army is faltering, any ceded territory could be retaken one day, perhaps later this year. 

^©2022 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.