Brian M Downing
Putin’s war hasn’t gone well. Attacks on Kyiv and Kharkiv have been driven back, and pincer movements from north and south in the Donbas pocket haven’t achieved much. More recently, however, Russia can rightly lay claim to two successes – Mariupol and the central Donbas pocket.
What’s their significance? Can they turn the tide for Moscow?
Mariupol
Russian troops have been battling for Mariupol since the war began three months ago. The Black Sea port is critical to the land bridge to Crimea, Kherson, and beyond. Russia hopes to control the entire coast, land-locking Ukraine and linking Russia to Transniester and Moldova.
The marine and Azov defenders surrendered last week after putting up ferocious defense, despite limited supplies. Prisoners of the Donetsk Republic now, they may be exchanged for Russian prisoners. However, at least some will be tried as war criminals to support the groundless claim that Ukrainians are neo-Nazis.
Vengeance will play a part too. Russian casualties must have been staggering. Defenders fought street by street, forcing several Russian BTGs to be withdrawn for refitting. Many thousands were probably killed or wounded. If Russia doesn’t know the term “Pyrrhic victory,” it soon will.
Donbas
Five weeks ago Russia shifted BTGs away from Kyiv and began an eastern offensive. A drive from Donetsk got nowhere, one from Izyum looked promising but petered out and became distracted by Ukrainian successes east of Kharkiv that endangered supply lines.
Russia is concentrating on the center of the Donbas pocket. This signals a shift from encircling the whole pocket to relying on heavy artillery and ground attacks to gradually push west. The aims are expanding control of eastern territories and wearing down Ukrainian forces.
Advances have been few and shallow until this week when Popasna in the central Donbas fell. The salient threatens Ukrainian positions near Severodonetsk and withdrawal may be needed.
New strength
How did this come about? The view here has been that the army is weakened by high casualties, declining morale, and rising disciplinary problems. This was especially so after poorly-organized assaults across a river (probably intended to link with Russian forces in Popasna). The attacks were disasters. Even official Russian media admitted it.
Three non-mutually exclusive factors may be at play. First, Ukrainian forces have been in heavy combat for three months and are exhausted. Some have been in less heavy fighting for years. Second, relentless heavy artillery destroyed positions and opened a path. Third, Russia may have recognized the poor quality of officers and replaced them with proven ones drawn from other units. The same may hold for enlisted ranks. Motivated, experienced troops have formed into more effective composite units.
If there are composite forces, two things follow: other Russian units have been stripped of their best troops and are all the weaker now; as composite troops are ground down around Popasna, which is inevitable, Russian offensive capacity will suffer greatly.
Assessment
The Popasna advance, though worrisome, doesn’t constitute a blitzkrieg-like breakthrough. Russia could not logistically support a deep thrust and concentrated armor formations would be hit hard from air and ground. At worst, Ukrainian troops may have to pull back from exposed positions. On their way, they could attack the Russian salient at Popasna from the north. As Robert Graves wryly observed when ordered to attack a German bulge in WW1, it looks ominous on maps but it’s vulnerable on three sides. The Russians must have taken very high casualties taking Popasna and will take even more trying to hold it.
If Russian offensives continue to falter, Moscow may shift its stated strategy from decisive breakthroughs to attrition. The shift may be under way as defense officials now speak of “woodchipper” operations: grinding down Ukrainian forces through heavy firepower.
Germany tried to break through French lines at Verdun in 1916 but when that failed, claimed the plan all along was to attrit the French. The Germans learned that attrition works both ways.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.