Brian M Downing
Putin’s would-be blitzkrieg in Ukraine is now a stalemate. The war will continue as long as his troops are across the border. Russia’s economy and state will weaken and the army will become increasingly ineffectual. Defeat is at hand, though official admission isn’t.
How much domestic opposition is coming? Will a significant and perhaps destabilizing opposition coalesce? How will supporters respond to failing fortunes?
National ideology
An independent polling firm found Putin’s prewar support above 80%. It’s likely to have slipped in the last few months but respondents no longer answer freely. Believing his support has dropped sharply is wishful thinking. The war and its rationale resonate powerfully in people whose outlooks have been shaped by family lore and nationalist socialization of repelling the Third Reich.
Opposition at present is limited to urban middle classes. Their numbers and importance are overestimated in the West, where democratic outcomes in the world seem inevitable, even in Russia. However, it’s naive and unhelpful to believe Russians think like us or soon will.
For most, Putin’s rationale for the war is intact and inspiring. The nation has been invaded by powerful enemies since the days of mighty princes defying the Mongols and Teutonic Knights. Later centuries saw invasions by the French Empire and the Third Reich, which were both defeated after long, costly ordeals.
Putin has had little difficulty presenting NATO and Ukraine as the latest danger. The Western alliance has crept steadily eastward, despite assurances it would not. The new Nazis have to be stopped, lest another devastating invasion be unleashed.
The Orthodox Church is behind the war. In the apocalyptic view of the Patriarch of Moscow, Russian troops are not only defending the realm but holding back the antichrist. Do unto the enemy what the Reich did unto us.
That’s the national ideology, and WW2 is a template. It’s not for nothing that Russian forces fly the old hammer and sickle banner. It doesn’t symbolize Lenin’s ideology, it stands for Stalin’s power.
Disquiet and opposition
Ideologies contain truths but usually alloy them with myths, boasts, and lies. Wars make that clear, especially if they drag on. Assurances of quick conquest, welcoming locals, and light casualties ring hollow. Statements step back from those of last week. A path is open to public reappraisals.
Continued casualties without signs of progress bring impatience. Russians saw the Wehrmacht encircled at Stalingrad and pushed back to Berlin. It was slow and bloody but signs of victory were unmistakeable and invigorating.
Reversals in Ukraine can’t be hidden. People wonder what happened to loved ones but are stonewalled and in cases, warned. Many think they’re being lied to. Embedded reporters recently deplored fiascos and openly blamed military leaders.
Soldiers give first-hand reports to families back home of incompetent leaders, inadequate supplies, and shoddy equipment. The occasional television commentator expresses doubts about the war. News anchors look on uncomfortably.
The perception of a poor man’s war might come to the fore. The war was ordered up by sybaritic oligarchs and remarkably wealthy civil servants. Those of humble means carry the burdens and suffer the casualties.
Support and repression
A majority, probably a large one, continues to support the war. The Great Patriotic War template holds its power. The enemy is at the gates again and fortunately a strong leader in the tradition of Stalin is in power. Adversities in Ukraine underline the cunning of enemies and their determination to humiliate Russia.
It took two years to defeat the Third Reich. The war today must be seen through until the latest peril from the West is quashed. The Russian people have the moral strength and unity to persevere.
Internal threats abound, as in Stalin’s day. The Great Man found them in the army, party, and public and eliminated them. Openness over the years has allowed traitors and defeatists to operate freely. A firm hand is needed again.
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The war has yet to bring strong popular opposition. Official ideology remains strong and has probably intensified, if not in actual numbers then in rancorous intolerance. Putin’s repressive capacity is still fearsome. As the war continues to go badly, he will impress that on opponents.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.