The Kharkiv front 

Brian M Downing 

Russia failed to reach Kyiv in its opening offensive in late February. It shifted to the Donbas two weeks ago, seeking to trap or grind down Ukrainian forces there. That isn’t faring any better. In fact, it’s gained less ground. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian counteroffensive near Kharkiv is quietly making progress. It might not be quiet for long. 

Russia appears willing to give up ground north and east of Kharkiv as its priorities lie elsewhere. The Donbas offensive plods on. The defense of Kherson in the south is important to holding the land bridge and the northern approaches to Crimea. And Russia may be planning an operation in western Ukraine near Transnistria. 

Ukrainian troops will probably reach Russian territory north of Kharkiv in less than a week. What’s next?

The Russian border

Ukraine forces have several options. First, they may stay on their side of the border and continue attritting the enemy with artillery, drones, and perhaps special forces raids. The new American 155mm artillery pieces have far greater range than Russian counterparts. 

Second, they may conduct cross-border attacks, claiming they were either by accident or in hot pursuit. These may be done in conjunction with similar attacks north of Kyiv on the border with Belarus. 

Third, Ukraine may expand attacks on ammo and fuel targets around Belgorod. The American artillery pieces coming in can hit parts of the Russian city. This will further hinder Russian operations in the east and south.

Fourth, Ukraine may launch a large-scale drive on Belgorod, or at least concentrate enough troops and supplies to make Moscow fear one. It knows Ukraine has shown considerable interest in Belgorod over the last month and losing the city would be a tremendous embarrassment. All but the most myopic generals know their forces are nearing exhaustion. Even a feint by Ukraine would tie down several Russian BTGs whose numbers and effectiveness diminish every week.

Izyum and the east 

Ukrainian forces may opt to stay put south of the Russian border near Kharkiv and drive east from positions in the recently-liberated villages of Molodova and Staryi Saltov. Even modest penetration east of Kharkiv would endanger Russian operations based in Izyum. Russian forces would have to risk being cut off from supply lines or halt operations and redeploy to defend them. 

Neither alternative is palatable to Moscow and each would effectively end the Donbas offensive. The push from Izyum has brought only little success but it’s more than’s been accomplished out of Donetsk or anywhere else along the Donbas salient.    

Failure will mean deeper humiliation for Russian generals and Putin’s coterie. Many generals will fear wrath and purges from above, lethargy and insubordination from below. The war will become a stalemate with more and more artillery, drones, and MANPADs reaching confident Ukrainian soldiers every week. The Russian army is reaching its end. And Putin’s grasp may be slipping.  

©2022 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.