Brian M Downing
Russia’s Donbas offensive is in its tenth day. It’s neither taken significant land nor worn down Ukrainian resolve. Russia has lost the initiative, and maybe more. Severe casualties aside, Putin’s military won’t be the same. The army is the strongest pillar of any autocracy and the one best positioned to bring change, if it wants to.
The Russian officer corps has heretofore toed the line. But amid an ongoing debacle, there may be infighting, fear of purges, and recognition of a need for reform. The military is becoming cautious, wary, and unable to act as a coherent institution.
Incoherency
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, JFK ruefully observed that success has many fathers but failure is an orphan. Russian officers will be blaming each other for the unwanted offspring and busily altering paternity tests, no matter how damning.
Company commanders and field grades, colonels and generals, political figures and chosen marshals, have all shown egregious incompetence. Training has been poor, coordination bad, and maintenance dreadful. Planners in Moscow severely overestimated their army’s abilities, greatly underestimated those of Ukraine, and badly miscalculated the international response.
Mistrust and recrimination will wrack the entire command system. Information will be less candid than ever. Orders will lead to demurrals and evasiveness. It will be less an army and more an assembly of embittered, recalcitrant, and antagonistic groupings.
Purges and fear of purges
Putin oversaw the organization of the army and the preparation for war. Naturally, he will hold inept and disloyal officers responsible for dismal implementation, and replace them. He may sense ominous disquiet among them. What autocrat doesn’t view his army with suspicion?
A large purge may be coming, perhaps in coming weeks when the Donbas offensive falls into stalemate. Stalin’s idealized memory has long been guiding Putin. The powerful forbear purged the army of traitors and went on to victory over the Third Reich. The parallel is dubious here, but appealing in the Kremlin.
Officers know that Putin handpicked his generals and ministers. He presided over the construction of a shamefully inept military – a Potemkin army that puts on impressive parades but can’t fight. Blame will be expressed quietly and only among trusted colleagues.
Cabals will form to discuss concluding the war, saving Russia, and protecting their hides. Some will look to the example of Alexander II who reformed the army from above after the Crimean War, others to the Decembrists who attempted reform from below after the Napoleonic Wars. A few may look around for Stauffenbergs and Becks. However, Putin is looking diligently for them too and he has his Himmlers and Heydrichs.
Next: army reformers.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.