Brian M Downing
Russia was driven out of the north and needs success in the Donbas to turn the tide. Failure would bring egregious military and political problems from frontline BTGs to the Kremlin inner sanctum. The need for victory can lead to incautious, even desperate moves and self-deception throughout the chain of command.
Moscow has three aims.
- Drive the Ukrainian army out of the east
- Consolidate the land bridge from Russian territory to the Crimea
- Prepare to drive on Odessa, which would cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea, and on Kyiv, which would end the war, at least in Moscow’s estimation.
There are two apparent ways of achieving these aims.
First, Russia could direct heavy bombardment and ground attacks across the Donbas salient which arcs from Kharkiv to Izyum to Luhansk to Donetsk to Kherson. This would gradually wear down Ukrainian units around the salient’s periphery and cause them to collapse or at least withdraw from the east.
This scenario, an attrition strategy with the expectation of rapid ground gains, involves no bold moves. It relies on superior firepower and numbers to overwhelm the enemy. That’s how the Red Army defeated the Third Reich in the last years of World War Two after the victories at Stalingrad and Kursk in 1943. The end point today is of course Kyiv rather than Berlin, but the destruction along the way will be the same if not greater.
Second, Russia could try to encircle Ukrainian troops in the Donbas salient. A force from Izyum in the north could drive south and link up with another force moving from Donetsk. The Ukrainians would either be trapped and annihilated or forced to scramble west, perhaps leaving a great deal of equipment behind and making further Russian advances toward Odessa and Kyiv easier.
This scenario entails risks. The two pincer movements would be exposed to counterattacks along lengthening flanks and would depend greatly on timely logistical support – something the Russians have thus far shown no mastery of.
A pincer drive and encirclement, however, holds the attraction of a quick, overwhelming victory – one that would conquer the east before inflows of Western equipment make the Ukrainians all the stronger. Perhaps most importantly, at least in the eyes of Vladimir Putin, it could reprise the Soviet Union’s encirclement of the Wehrmacht’s Sixth Army at Stalingrad.
The Ukrainian conflict is in Putin’s mind a reprise of the Great Patriotic War against Nazis. He wants to restore Russia’s undisputed might in the world and its empire in Europe. Little wonder that hammer and sickle flags fly from Russian tanks – and that the Stalingrad victory is an appealing model.
The offensive has been underway five days now but the absence of significant change in the lines prevents certainty on which option has been taken. There have been minor advances out of Izyum and Donetsk which suggest the pincer-encirclement option, though they may have been intended to draw Ukrainian troops away from other areas in the salient. Failed pincer-encirclement attacks may force Russia to adopt the first option of wearing down Ukrainian forces along the Donbas salient.
Neither scenario is promising. The Russians don’t have great numerical superiority along the salient. An attempt to concentrate at a few points would be easily detected by Ukrainian and Western intelligence and effectively countered along interior lines of communication.
Furthermore, the Ukrainians troops are better disciplined and equipped and are fighting from defensive positions on their home soil. However, Russian leaders will deny or minimize those advantages as they seek to turn the tide.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.