Brian M Downing
The Russian army is preparing an offensive in the east, perhaps along the Black Sea coast as well. It comes on the heels of disastrous, costly failures to take Kiev and Kharkiv. The battered troops withdrew unceremoniously and are heading to the east.
The view here is that the Russian army was flawed before the war. Some 25% of its troops are poorly-trained and unmotivated conscripts who don’t mesh with dedicated regulars. Promotions are based on political loyalties not professional standards, weakening leadership and competence up and down the chain of command. Harsh discipline enervates initiative and cohesion, both crucial in combat.
The last point needs amending. Harsh training and barracks life don’t instill proper discipline, only fear and resentment. The result is poor performance against the enemy and grisly atrocities against civilians.
With defeat looming, the army, at least parts of it, must see the need for changes. Has it learned anything in recent weeks? Is it capable of reforming itself?
Logistics
Troops driving on Kiev ran out of fuel. Soldiers developed frostbite for lack of blankets and tents. Many foraged for food. Paradoxically, it recalled Napoleon’s march out of Moscow, only with less progress.
Those in charge of the supply chain may have learned to avoid chokepoints, smooth out inefficiencies, and maintain vehicles. But there are new supply routes, lines are longer, and depots are relocating from Belarus to southern Russia. Ukrainian special forces are damaging roads and tracks along the way.
New officers
Ukrainian forces have targeted field-grade officers and higher. Thirty-two colonels and seven generals have been killed. As noted, Russian officers are promoted on the basis of loyalties and connections. They don’t rock the boat no matter how rotten the hulls and how ominous the seas.
It’s possible that new officers are more able than predecessors. However, a courtier culture pervades the officer corps and the replacement pool is unlikely to offer significant improvement. Reform will take years and it will be resisted.
Unit cohesion
Small units have not shown competence. Troops under fire look confused and leaderless. They often fail to form perimeters and don’t return fire skillfully. Armor units move out without infantry support. Casualties have been high.
Combat troops could be pulling together. It’s possible that hard experiences forged them into better fighting units. Trust in fellow soldiers may have developed. Officers may have realized that survival depends on creating rapport rather than simply barking orders.
However, there were serious problems before the war that cannot be fixed anytime soon. You go to war with the army you have. There’s long been a dearth of junior officers, which means critical gears between commanders and Kalashnikovs are wobbly or missing entirely. Remarkably, 25% of infantrymen couldn’t operate key equipment (presumably night-fighting equipment and commo gear).
The basic fighting unit, BTG, comprises infantry, armor, artillery, engineering, and supply units. The design skimped on infantry and with high casualties in that component, the BTG loses considerable punch. Add in armor losses to drones and Javelins, and many BTGs are ineffectual. That’s the US assessment now.
Strengthening combat cohesion before the eastern offensive will be difficult. Infantry losses from hostile fire, morale, and frostbite are high. Integrating new soldiers brings resentments and reduces any hard-won fighting ability, especially if many newbies are conscripts.
Moscow faces a dilemma: waiting months to properly reconstitute forces or throwing weakened units back into combat in a week or two. The eagerness for a win makes the latter more likely. Either way, the Russians will go up against Ukrainian troops with superior discipline, morale, and weaponry.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.