Brian M Downing
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is becoming increasingly murderous. Ukrainian soldiers and civilians are putting up fierce resistance and the West continues to send in effective weaponry. Wars, as John Nef tells us, bring innovation. One innovation can inflict considerable damage on Russia’s ability to wage war.
The West can make use of its wealth and openness by offering defecting Russian soldiers cash rewards and residence rights. It could do considerable harm to Russian cohesion, morale, and discipline without incurring great risks or costs, without firing a shot.
Amid our War of Independence British and Hessian soldiers were offered tracts of land if they dropped their Brown Besses and left King George’s service. More recently, North Koreans are rewarded for coming south. Kiev has already offered a million dollar reward and foreign residency to defecting Russian pilots. Thus far there’ve been no takers. Modest incentives, offered to simple soldiers, could be more successful.
Russia’s million-man army has hundreds of thousands of fiercely loyal soldiers. They are fervently patriotic and deeply proud of ancestors’ service in previous conflicts, especially the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). Incentives to defect won’t work with them, at least not now. A year of hardships and deaths might change things though.
At the other end of the spectrum are conscripts, who compose 25% of active-duty troops. Their service is presently only one year and they’re probably not in frontline units. But the war will become increasingly unconventional. Guerrillas will routinely hit supply lines and rear areas. The conscripts’ year will pass slowly and tours may be extended for another year, perhaps for the duration.
Between the hardcore and draftees is a middle stratum of soldiers, many of whom will find war dispiriting and life back home unappealing.
A Russian conscript makes $240 per year, a volunteer gets $8000 per year. They can’t bring MiGs with them but a reward of, say, twenty-five thousand dollars (about three million rubles) would have its attractions. The same can be said of a new life in the West with its openness and opportunity, both of which are disappearing in wartime Russia. Their families would face ostracism or worse, but new identities could be given.
The number of defections cannot be predicted but they will almost certainly be more numerous as the war drags on, perhaps into 2023 and beyond. If Belarusian troops are brought in they will find the incentives highly attractive.
The incentive program will cause other problems. NCOs, already burdened with maintaining operations, discipline, and morale, will have to watch for signs of disaffection. Many will worry about being shot by troops who want to light out.
Higher-ups will have to think twice about small patrols which though providing critical intelligence, also offer more opportunity to desert. Discipline could get even harsher than it is, leading to more disaffection and greater incentive to go over the hill.
The Russian army has been plagued for decades by unmotivated conscripts, poor leadership, shoddy equipment, unreliable supply systems, and a brutal institutional culture. Casualties in Putin’s war are wearing the army down and in six months it will face manpower shortages, disciplinary troubles, infighting at the top, and opposition from home.
Paralysis may be coming. Providing incentives to desert can hasten the day.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.