Escalation and termination in Putin’s war 

Brian M Downing 

During the buildup to war, western analysts expected Putin to understand military and global realities. The view here was that his campaign would be limited to seizing territory in the east and driving toward Kiev in order to force Zelensky’s hand. Others thought the effort would be even less, perhaps little more than a bluff.

Instead we have sizable offensives in the east, south, and north and attempts to seize Kiev, Kharkiv, Mariupol, and other major cities. It’’s not going well. Russian casualties are mounting, logistics are failing, and opposition in and out of the Ukraine is growing.

Putin and his generals are in a difficult situation. They may be looking askance at one another and may come to blows, figuratively or literally. Putin is a danger to world peace but also to Russia. 

The war

Three major drives are underway – from separatist areas in the east, the previously annexed Crimea, and Belarus in the north. The long ominous arrows on maps look daunting but that’s misleading. The flanks are being attacked by Ukrainian troops and partisans, disrupting supplies to spearhead troops and forcing allocation of troops to convoy defenses.

Even if Russian troops take Kiev and other cities, fierce resistance will continue indefinitely. Lavrov cocktails will fly. Rural areas will also continue the fight and serve as logistical hubs for urban fighters. Foreign powers will send more and more antitank missiles.

In 2003 US General Shinseki said that several hundred thousand US troops would be needed to stabilize Iraq. Russian generals know the Ukraine is much larger and far more populous. The grim math is unfavorable to them.

Russian generals may look back on their history and recall that the Third Reich’s formidable drives were met with spirited resistance from a unified people, before its armies limped back toward Berlin. Kiev could be a reverse Stalingrad, where the Reich’s Sixth Army was annihilated. Some generals know that Field Marshal Paulus never made it out and that his superiors were eventually hanged. 

Putin’s responses 

The power holder in Moscow will not admit error and pull back. He might, however, realize he cannot control the Ukraine or even a significant portion of it and announce he has accomplished his goal of defending ethnically-Russian areas and warning the West. In essence, declare victory and go home. This is unlikely as it would be a bitter defeat, no matter how his ministers and RT present it.

More likely he will order his generals to be more aggressive and finish the campaigns on Kiev, Kharkiv, and elsewhere in short order. A military amateur might think the delays were caused by incompetent or timid officers, or suspect they are against him and want him to fail. More devastating attacks may be coming, including the destruction of swathes of cities. Remember that Putin razed the Chechen capital Grozny not long ago.

Harsher measures will not bring success, only more casualties and greater yearning for vengeance among Ukrainians. Putin may replace more generals and order greater aggressiveness but with no greater success.   

The generals’ responses

Military leaders will comply with Putin’s decrees for now, but victory will remain out of reach. They will see casualties rise in elite units, eventually to levels that require them to come off the line. We saw this with Iraqi special forces during the Mosul campaign. Afghan elite units were worn down to nothing.

Attrition in elite units will require bringing up regular battalions. They are not as well trained or motivated and many have conscripts who dislike military service and will not be effective. Some will  refuse orders or desert. Better to live in the Ukraine than die there.  

Russian generals were lieutenants in Afghanistan. They recognize an emerging stalemate that will needlessly grind down the effectiveness and prestige of the military. They may also know that the Kremlin eventually saw the futility of the Afghan war and ordered withdrawal. 

Putin is a low-level KGB enforcer who clawed his way to the top during a period of confusion. He is well beyond his level of competence. National security is now at a 25-year low. Stalemate and defeat loom. 

Under the stress of stalemate and global opposition, Putin may become erratic, suspicious, unreasoning, vengeful, and unable to gauge military and international realities. Purges may come. His recent alert to nuclear forces isn’t the action of a sound leader. There is no legal way to oust him. Putin’s autocracy has no succession process, no heir, no party machinery, only a weak obliging duma and a coterie of billionaires who are more interested in Swiss accounts than Russian stability. 

The generals may have to take decisive action in the national interest. They may announce that Putin no longer controls the army, including its nuclear arsenals. Experts will replace an erratic dilettante and handle the Ukraine matter themselves. Alternately, they may detain him while on an inspection and exile him. 

However, the generals know that as long as Putin remains alive he can rally security forces and other loyalists and play upon indecisiveness in the opposition. Russia needs decisive action. 

©2022 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.