Brian M Downing
Putin’s rule is highly personal and despotic. He’s built a cult of personality – something that Russians had hoped ended with Stalin. There’s no institution or process to ensure orderly succession, leaving Russia open to turmoil upon his death. That concerns many Russians.
Putin’s foreign policy may also cause concern. He sees himself as a chess master with his armor and pipeline pieces moving across the board, increasing his power and prestige. Military and security bureaus may see a bad move taking place in the Ukraine and checkmate coming in a decade or two from the east.
The Ukraine
Growing pressure on Kiev since late year has not brought destabilizing panic in the public, paralysis in the state, or fear in the military. It has brought unity, resolve, and preparation. Defensive positions are being built, the army is less corrupt, new weaponry is reaching units, and civilians are training in irregular warfare.
Even if, as predicted here in December, Russian forces only consolidate in the east where ethnic Russians live, there are large numbers of Ukrainians who will resist. Some, drawing on longstanding hatred of Moscow and recent military training, will fight. They will undoubtedly receive aid from Kiev and possibly from NATO powers as well. Resistance could spread to the Crimea, especially among its Muslim population.
NATO
Putin believes he is challenging NATO, showing the pact’s internal weaknesses, causing and deepening divisions, nudging it toward breakup like the EU. Putin would point proudly to Germany’s soft response to the Ukrainian tensions. It will not send arms to Kiev or deploy troops to the east.
However, the response of other NATO powers has been surprisingly strong, far stronger than during the Libyan campaign. Member countries have deployed troops to Eastern Europe and provided arms and trainers to Ukrainian troops. The US a year ago seemed to have lost much of its diplomatic leverage but today its position is much stronger – thanks in part to Putin and his ally in Beijing.
Putin may dismiss this but Russian security bureaus cannot. Greater NATO resolve and more troops along Russia’s western borders will be interpreted as a danger. More resources will have to be allocated there rather than to Central Asia where Islamist bands are forming and another danger looms. More farsighted security officials are wary of China’s rising chauvinism, economic dominance in Russia’s Near Abroad, and resentment over treaties and concessions forced on it by tsars in centuries past.
Sanctions
Whatever the military outcome, invasion will bring strong sanctions. Nord Stream 2 will probably be blocked. Commerce with the EU will suffer. Many countries will shift away from Russian oil and gas and go with less objectionable sources in the eastern Mediterranean, western Libya, and the United States. The shift may take many years but the consequences will be formidable. The Russian economy will not collapse but it won’t grow as dynamically as politicians hope and the public expects.
The generals won’t be pleased by a sluggish economy. Lower export revenue means less money for defense, less R&D for new weaponry, less training for the many indifferently trained units, especially those in the east.
The Russian economy will gravitate toward the east. China’s economy is booming. It will surpass America’s in a decade or so. From a purely economic perspective, Russia may do reasonably well. However, China’s economy is already ten times Russia’s and in coming decades, as China develops Central Asia and brings the region into its sphere, Russia may become reduced to beholden partner.
Analysts in and out of Russia see the war as based on Putin’s yen for power and an honored place in history alongside the great tsars, field marshals, and general secretaries. But Russia will gain little from it and may lose quite a bit, especially in the long run.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.