Brian M Downing
Israel and Russia were once enemies. Moscow backed Arab states against the emerging Jewish state in 1948 and then in the 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars. Things changed. Israel and Russia now have important ties based on trade and geopolitics. The Ukraine crisis, though seemingly beyond Israel’s concern, may bring new change.
The unlikely partnership
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Moscow was desperate to restore its economy and power prestige. If took the extraordinary step of working with Israel – widely unexpected given Moscow’s past support for Arab states and terrorist groups.
Both sides benefited. Israel got Russian oil, which was essential as Israel’s relations with its traditional supplier, Iran, were deteriorating. Russia in return got technology, including military equipment, and contracts to develop gas tracts in the Mediterranean.
Good terms with Russia added to Israel’s security. Longstanding enemies, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, relied on Moscow’s equipment and trainers. No Russian backing, no war on Israel. Though all three enemies either have good ties with Israel or are in domestic chaos, Israeli-Russian comity adds a layer of security.
Russia resurgent
Russia is more assertive than thirty years ago when its economy, military, and standing in the world were in tatters. The economy has been buoyed by high oil prices and the money has rebuilt the military. Moscow has forged a strategic alliance with China. The two states could dominate most of the Eurasian land mass and get the upper hands on commodities such as oil, iron, copper, rare earths, and several others. Russia can also benefit from Chinese hi-tech which has made great strides in the last decade.
Russia has built military bases in Libya and Syria and used, at least briefly, an airfield in Iran. Moscow sells arms to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Qatar. It is once again a force in the region.
The Ukraine
Russian aggression in the Ukraine presents danger for Israel. The 2013 takeover of the Crimea gave Moscow the military bases and port facilities that its policies in Libya, Syria, the Sahel, and East Africa needed. Further expansion in the eastern Ukraine will consolidate those positions and allow for greater efforts in the region.
Victory in the Ukraine will make Putin more ambitious and perhaps more dangerous and unreliable. Russian nationalism has historically gone hand in hand with antisemitism. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the Black Hundreds, and scores of pogroms have been based in the country’s nationalism. Despite comity with Israel, antisemitism pervades Russian culture from bottom to top.
Putin may be making a new strategic calculus. Access to Arab arms markets would bring billions to his defense industries – at the expense of the US, which he hopes to weaken, economically and politically. The gains would exceed those from Israel – probably greatly so. Oil markets can be reached without an Israeli pipeline. Chinese hi tech is right up there these days.
Putin’s calculus must take in Israel’s actions against his two closest allies in the Middle East. Israel has assassinated over a dozen Iranian scientists and supported bombings of military facilities. It has supported Syrian rebels and sought to detach the Druze region across from Golan from Damascus’s control. IDF jets and missiles routinely strike Iranian, Hisbollah, and government positions in Syria. Damascus’s request for help has long been ignore.
But things are changing. Putin is signaling that his patience is wearing thin. Russian and Syrian jets have recently begun joint patrols.
Israeli strategic thinkers would do well to see the prospects of a dangerous shift in Russian expectations and priorities. Moscow’s opportunities in the region are clear. Jerusalem’s missteps are becoming apparent. A Putin victory in the Ukraine could be the catalyst for a jarring deterioration of Israel’s security.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.