Brian M Downing
Justifications
The second response to the 9/11 attacks was the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Several justifications were advanced. First, Saddam Hussein was said to be developing WMDs which could be used against American cities. However, the intelligence assessment did not claim high certainty and doubts abounded. The White House spared the public any mention of doubt, and support for the war grew steadily in the lead-up.
Second, key al Qaeda personnel were said to have met with Iraqi officials. This gave the war a plausible link to 9/11 in the public’s mind.
Third, Iraq was said to be holding an American naval pilot – this at time when a string of movies had firmly established the POW/MIA myth in the American mind.
Fourth, days before the invasion, the Bush administration began justifying the war in terms of bringing democracy to Iraq and beyond. That of course resonated with the democratization of Germany and Japan after WW2 which Americans took great pride in.
No WMDs were found. Iraqi-al Qaeda ties were never clearly established. The navy pilot’s remains were recovered from a crash site. He had never been POW. The commanding general who directed the 2003 retired from the military, leaving the aftermath to others.
Consequences
Jihadism is far stronger in Iraq and elsewhere. That can be largely attributed to swollen youth cohorts, detested rulers, Wahhabi schools, and boyish attractions to battle. However, the war in Iraq destroyed the state’s repressive capacity, attracted a new generation of jihadis from across the Middle East, and established local support for jihadis. ISIL’s fortunes have declined since its apogee in 2014 but it retains a presence in western Iraq and eastern Syria. It will likely be there for many years, perhaps decades.
Iran benefited greatly from the US war. An army that wreaked havoc on Iran for eight years was defeated in a few days then disbanded. It was known at the outset of the war that Iraq was 60% Shia and they would move closer Iran. It was further known that during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1990s Tehran built up political groups and militia bands inside Iraq. Washington was nonetheless aghast at the rise of Iranian influence.
Ousting a Sunni government and replacing it with a Shia one gravely worsened sectarian hatreds in the region. A vicious civil war has eased but both camps have militias and foreign support. Saudi Arabia and other Sunni monarchies are deeply concerned with Shia power in Iraq and try to purchase influence with political parties and militias.
Democracy has not prospered in Iraq but neither has it failed entirely. The sudden beginning of a parliamentary system saw the rise of a dozen sizable parties and many smaller ones that can be decisive in coalition-building. Stable coalitions are hard to come by and negotiations drag on for many months. One coalition was hammered out only after the intervention of IRGC General Soleimani. The US assassinated him last year.
Saddam held the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds together through politicking and force. Democratic leaders thus far are not so clever or ruthless and the country is barely in one piece. Stalemate and corruption are bringing discontent with major parties and democracy itself.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.