Brian M Downing
Early concerns and defections
Shortly after the Vietnam buildup in 1965, Sen William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) chaired hearings. Foreign policy and military experts, including George F Kennan questioned the strategic justifications for the war and the way it was being fought. Fulbright’s investigations were on television. Public support for the war, only about 64% in 1965, slowly waned. This was probably due more to continuing casualties without signs of progress than to Fulbright’s witnesses.
By 1967 it was clear in the high councils of government that the war was going nowhere. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy was quietly critical of the war and the Saigon government. He looked to leave government and speak candidly. Defense chief Robert McNamara soured on the war, especially after the Institute for Defense Analyses concluded N Vietnam could replace its losses indefinitely. McNamara was visibly shaken, in private and in public. Johnson announced McNamara’s departure in November 1967. His successor, Clark Clifford, worked to build support for disengagement.
Retired three-star general James Gavin expressed deep skepticism about the way the war was being fought. David Shoup, a retired four-star marine general and Medal of Honor recipient was blunter:
I believe that if we had and would keep our dirty, bloody, dollar-soaked fingers out of the business of these nations so full of depressed, exploited people, they will arrive at a solution of their own.
The Tet Offensive
The Viet Cong/NVA attacks of early 1968 are seen as a turning point in the war. They certainly were, but not the way usually thought. Support for the war is said to have fallen sharply. It’s been said a thousand times and it will continue to be said. It isn’t true though. The Tet Offensive did not affect public support. Polling data show that support declined and opposition rose at the same rate before Tet and after it. (John E Mueller, Wars, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley, 1973, pp. 164-65.) Tet’s impact was on elites.
LBJ periodically gathered a group of advisors, in and out of government, to discuss the war. Informally called the Wise Men and including retired statesmen and generals, they had always been supportive of the war. In March 1968 the Wise Men convened and listened to the latest intelligence briefings.
McGeorge Bundy, out of government by then, told LBJ, “There has been a very significant shift in most of our positions since we last met. A majority now hold the view that we must begin to take steps to disengage.” Former Sec of State Dean Acheson concurred: “We can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left, and we must begin to take steps to disengage.”Johnson was shocked. Acheson shot back that he should be shocked and that he had been misled about the war for years.
Johnson decided a few days later not to run for reelection and to leave the war to his successor. Richard Nixon took office the following January and began to withdraw US troops from Vietnam and shift the war onto the S Vietnamese. Four years later US military involvement was over.
Where are the Wise Men?
Politicians were mostly loth to criticize the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. They didn’t want to be accused of being disloyal or not supporting the troops. Former national security officials stayed mum. Generals didn’t reason why. The absence of sizable opposition in the public gave policymakers the illusion things might work out and there was no Taliban Tet. There are no more Bundys or McNamaras, let alone a Shoup. Former presidents manage to hold their heads high.
America has changed greatly because of Vietnam. Senses of civic duty and national community are weaker, vanity and self-absorption stronger. The problem’s most acute in sports, entertainment, and the affluent but it pervades the political and military elite as well and motivates them to seek power and hold on to it. Empathy, guilt, and shame are faint echoes in their hollow beings. Our policymakers are sociopaths, incapable of admitting error or feeling remorse for the deaths they’ve caused.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.