Brian M Downing
The sudden, complete disintegration of the Afghan army and state has led to dismal scenes at the Kabul airport and around the country. A debate is beginning here. It will be partisan, uninformed, boorish, and unlikely to offer insight for future conflicts.
One argument heard from politicians and generals and pundits holds that the US should have maintained a moderate number of troops, say, ten thousand – the level of a year ago when the previous president agreed to a complete pullout. Those troops, it’s contended, would have stabilized the situation and prevented collapse.
The argument has been advanced by retired general David Petraeus. An extended presence, he contends, would have been “sustainable” (a talisman-like word in political discourse) and collapse would’ve been avoided. Petraeus’s endorsement makes the argument sound credible but it’s wrong.
What would a continued presence of ten thousand GIs accomplish in, say, five more years?
The ANA
The Afghan military has been trained and advised and backed up by American troops for almost two decades. From its inception to the present, it’s been hamstrung by ethnic antagonisms and lack of confidence in its officers, most of whom got their positions through bribery and connections.
A continued American presence would not have alleviated these problems. or initiated reform. The army’s ground combat units, air force squadrons, logistical battalions, and maintenance depots would be just as ineffectual and on the edge of collapse.
Years of warfare at the level of the last five years or so would have worn down the ANA, especially its special forces units, and we would be in the same military position we were when the end came.
The Taliban
The other side would of course be at least susceptible to attrition, war-weariness, and dissolution. Two things made the Taliban more coherent and successful over the years.
First, Taliban expansion came only partly from military conquest. Much of it followed parleys with locals, finding common ground in detesting local officials, and opposing the presence of foreign troops. District after district came over through talks not skirmishes. This was especially the case in the north where against most expectations, the Taliban won over non-Pashtun districts.
Second, in the last ten years the war took on a much broader context than most in Washington realized. It became a conflict between the US and Afghanistan on one side and the Taliban, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran on the other.
The latter three powers were determined to ensnare and humiliate the US and supplied its enemy with money, weaponry, intelligence, and the promise of unflagging support in war and peace. Taliban confidence never wavered.
Afghanistan 2025
Taliban forces would have continued to expand across the country through parley and military force. The ANA would be no more effective. Its special forces would be worn down and near disintegration.
The residual US presence would be increasingly isolated and beleaguered as the Taliban saw the end game in sight and began targeting them with rocket and mortar fire and ambushes. Sudden, complete disintegration of the Afghan army and state would be at hand.
Washington would have three options. First, US troops could return to combat roles in order to beef up frail ANA positions. Second, the US could send in more ground and air units. These two options open the door to another few years of fighting and dying, at least.Third, Washington could realize that a quarter century was enough and order a pullout.
Nothing would have ended differently, only later. Petraeus and the others who advance the residual-force argument are wrong. They want to defend two decades of error and bolster myths of military interventionism and their own mastery of foreign policy.
It must be borne in mind that Petraeus directed operations in Afghanistan (2008-11) and was certain troop increases and counterinsurgency programs would turn the tide. There was no change, despite the presence of 150,000 US and ISAF troops and thousands of casualties.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.