Brian M Downing
The Taliban are in power. Their opponents have fled, their soldiers patrol the capital, Western countries are scurrying to get personnel out. Taliban control was never complete in their first emirate. There were redoubts in the north and insurgencies elsewhere. The second emirate will face instabilities as well.
Public unrest
In the 1990s the Taliban imposed their rule on a country very different from the one they now president over. The population no longer comprises a largely traditional array of farmers, herdsmen, manual laborers, and their wives and children.
Over the last twenty years, especially in cities, westernization has taken hold. There are schools for all and shopping malls with American styles, greater freedom of expression and openness. Women wear what they wish, go out unescorted, and speak frankly. The Taliban will have to come to terms with this, one way or another.
The Taliban’s claims of being moderate were well-presented, perhaps well-received, but weren’t convincing. Their presentation sounded as though shaped by media consultants, complete with words like “inclusiveness” – a word not found in Pashtun theological or political tracts. The recent killing of three protesters in Jalalabad demonstrate that public protest, such as showing the Afghan flag rather than the Taliban banner, will not be tolerated.
Demonstrations will continue, spread, and even intensify. They will take place in a global context of political activism, self-expression, discontent with staid institutions and norms, and rising expectations of freedom. This may energize Afghans, especially women, who have the most to fear, but it’s unlikely to further their cause. Authoritarian states such as Russia, Belarus, and Thailand have allowed a measure of demonstrations for many months and years.
The Taliban may not be so accommodating. They are zealous rural-dwellers, hardened from long years of hardship and ill-disposed to accepting opposition from people they believe they liberated, especially if soft urban-dwellers of non-Pashtun breeding. But they know that harsh repression could embarrass them and their mentors in Beijing and soften international support for international aid and commerce. The old emirate was unable to rebuild the country or develop comity with the outside world.
Longer term, discontent and poor growth could lead to violent opposition in the form of rural insurgency or urban terrorism. The Taliban know there are a lot of assault rifles and explosives lying around since the ANA collapsed and they want to collect them quickly.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.