Brian M Downing
Iran shows no urgency in returning to the JCPOA and getting sanctions lifted. Since the Biden administration came into office in January, Iranian militias in Iraq have stepped up attacks on US positions. The Houthis have gone on the offensive in Yemen. And most recently a drone, probably directed from Iran, struck a tanker tied to an Israeli firm while it was off the coast Oman, not far from the Strait of Hormuz – the fourth such incident in the region over the last year.
Israeli is threatening military action. This could take the form of sharper attacks on Iran or its shipping.
Iran’s actions aren’t always reported in the context of at least fifteen years of attacks by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni states, including assassinations and bombings inside the Islamic Republic.
Tehran is willing to continue low-level hostilities and forgo a return to the JCPOA and sanctions relief in the next six months or year. It feels able to weather more hardship and suppress opposition. What does Tehran hope to gain by this?
Iran’s outlook
Some American foreign policy hands believe the Biden administration can improve relations with Tehran, though the new hardline government will make this more difficult. The view here has been quite different. Iran has suffered violent attacks that have killed scores of its people, including a respected if not revered general.
The US has at least condoned these attacks and was directly responsible for the general’s death. Washington is allied, closely and immutably, with determined foes of Iran and is pressured by them to do their bidding, even though the actions are not always in US interests.
Rapprochement, then, is neither wanted nor possible. Tehran feels it has taken years of attacks and now wants vengeance. It will continue a range of attacks on US, Saudi, and Israeli targets and hope to weaken all three powers, mainly the US.
Division between US and its allies
Tensions in the Gulf will cause trouble for Washington in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. Traditional allies in Europe and Asia are already annoyed by sanctions on Iran as it deprived them of promising trade with a country of 83 million people with rising disposable incomes. Conflict delays a return to commerce, threatens to raise oil prices, and could lead to open warfare as in the eighties.
Most upsetting to allies is the absence of evidence Iran has a nuclear weapons program – the reason the previous administration quit the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions. The CIA has testified before Congress that Iran remains in compliance. From the perspective of allies, US foreign policy rests all too often on pressure groups and campaign donations.
Saudi Arabia and Israel are pressing for a military response. In other words, they want the US to attack Iran. Biden is unlikely to deliver it and this will lead to claims of weakness and unreliability in Congress and the media. Washington is already deeply antagonistic and Iran would relish worsening it.
Iran may calculate that support for Israel is not what it once was. The rise of the Israeli Right and the recent Gaza campaign have seen to that. Continued conflict between Israel and Iran may elicit reappraisal of the US traditional unflinching support for Israel.
The New York Times, historically a stalwart backer of Israel, has recently contextualized the recent Iranian attack on an Israeli tanker by noting Israel has been attacking Iranian shipping for several years now.
Underscore Saudi weakness
Iran will likely continue attacks on Saudi assets such as oil infrastructure inside the kingdom and perhaps on Saudi shipping as well. This will make it clear to all that despite immense arms purchases and a large, well-appointed military, the Saudis are unable to defend themselves. When Iranian drones hit Saudi oil facilities in 2019, the most robust response was the deployment of a US air defense detachment.
More attacks will cause considerable embarrassment to Mohammad bin Salman. He’s already vulnerable to charges of increasing oppression, a facade of reform, dubious piety, alliance with Israel, and wasteful spending abroad. Weakness vis a vis Iran and more obvious reliance on the United States can lead to more vocal opposition and violent attacks.
Opening to China
The Gulf conflict opens a path for China to boost its prestige on the world stage and weaken America’s. The US is firmly on the Sunni side and two decades of neoconservative-directed policies have turned Iran from seeking rapprochement with the US to aligning with China and Russia against it.
China buys copious amounts of oil and gas from both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Other trade has come along. So influential is China that neither side is willing to criticize it over its treatment of its Muslim peoples, especially the millions of Uighur. Both sides of the Gulf see what’s on the horizon the horizon.
Chinese diplomacy can point out to the Sunnis that the US is not going to deliver a major blow on Iran. Neither Bush the Younger nor Trump would and a more aggressive president is unlikely in coming years. Indeed, the US’s viability as a major actor in the world is in doubt.
Hostility serves no purpose except to divide and weaken the Islamic world. Both sides will benefit from a cessation of hostilities and a closer partnership with China, economically and geopolitically. China can become the hegemon of the Gulf, holding rivals back from acts of war through strategic oil purchases, investments, and access to the immense Chinese market. Every ruler up and down the Gulf saw what Russia did to rebel cities in Syria and they know the US won’t do that to keep them in power. China and Russia will back them to the hilt.
Iran is positioned to weaken the US and advance China’s march to global greatness. Iran’s diplomatic adroitness and America’s heavy-handed blundering will play equally important roles.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.