Brian M Downing
As more districts fall concerns mount as to what will become of the country. One of more alarming claims, one used in calls for the US to reconsider withdrawal, is that it will become a sanctuary for al Qaeda and ISIL.
The view here has long been that the US can achieve nothing by staying and we should get out completely. What of the concern of a sanctuary for jihadis? Would they pose a threat to the US? Or would they target regional powers?
The al Qaeda and ISIL presence
Those who fear AQ’s return may be unaware it already is there. After a brief retreat into Pakistan, where it almost certainly received help from the Pakistani military, it returned to a rugged mountainous redoubt in eastern Afghanistan. Our 20-year presence was able to expel it for only a year or so.
The jihadis aligned with fiercely independent Afghan tribes, the “honor tribes” that have resisted Kabul’s authority for generations. The tribes’ women have married al Qaeda fighters and those of like-minded jihadis such as Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan, and Uighur fighters fresh from the Levant.
The miscellany of Islamist bands number no more than a few thousand, if that, and they rarely engage US or ANA troops, who for their part have rarely ventured near the redoubt.
The leaders of AQ, Zawahiri et al, are more important than the small bands of fighters as they have residual prestige in the global jihadi movement. However, they have been greatly overshadowed by AQ groups in the Maghreb, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere, and by the rise of ISIL. The leaders are thought to be in Pakistan – under the protection of Pakistani generals.
Following its 2014 successes in Iraq, ISIL established cells in southern Afghanistan in the hopes of building a movement that would one day link up with forces in the Levant. Following recent defeats, ISIL has placed emphasis on Afghanistan though without notable success. The cells remain small, isolated, and generally at odds with the Taliban, which sees them as rivals.
The Future
What might a Taliban victory hold for jihadi bands? When in power during the 90s, one Taliban faction supported spreading Islamism into other countries, while another focused on domestic consolidation. The factions are still there but it’s unknown which is now stronger.
If an internationalist wing prevails and aligns with jihadi groups to spread across borders, the Taliban will have deep trouble with regional powers. They will restrict or completely cut off sorely needed reconstruction aid. The Taliban know well that economic stagnation caused trouble and insurgency back in the 90s. The regional powers may even support insurgency or initiate punitive attacks. Recall what Russia did to rebel cities in Syria and to Grozny in its own Chechen region.
Regardless of the Taliban’s disposition, jihadi groups do not have the same outlooks they had in 2001. Osama bin Laden was outraged by the US presence near holy sites in Saudi Arabia and yearned to strike the American targets. The US has a minimal military presence in the Kingdom now and has troops in Iraq and Syria and up and down the Gulf. Nonetheless, Islamist groups have more state enemies now and with the US departure priorities and opportunities will shift to more proximate enemies.
Russia There is lingering hostility toward Moscow from the 80s war which saw considerable brutality. Villages and towns deemed supportive of the mujahideen were leveled and stories of such attacks are part of local lore. Russian aid to the Taliban in recent years may have eased hatreds slightly but Russia is much closer to traditional Tajik and Uzbek enemies.
ISIL and AQ fighters in Afghanistan are hostile to Russia for supporting Assad in Syria and playing an important part in defeating them in Syria. US troops were important in ending the caliphate in eastern Syria and western Iraq, but American forces will be far away. Russians are closer and situated in territory coveted by Islamists, as will be noted.
China While the US was fighting the Taliban and funding development projects, China has been gaining control of the country’s considerable resources of copper, iron, oil, and rare earths.
Upon the US’s departure in September, Afghans will realize to their dismay that Kabul has sold the country into Beijing’s co-prosperity sphere. In coming years Chinese engineers, managers, workers, consultants, and diplomats will become more numerous and obvious than American counterparts were.
China’s mistreatment of its Uighur and other Muslim peoples will make it the target of AQ and ISIL forces. This will be the case in Afghanistan but also throughout Central Asia and western China. There are already Uighur contingents in AQ and ISIL groups in Afghanistan. A Sino-Muslim conflict will rage across Central Asia for a generation or more.
ISIL once ruled a swathe of territory it called a Caliphate but it has been reduced to a guerrilla movement. It’s now looking to rebuild the Caliphate in Afghanistan and the ‘Stans. Echoing Islamist apocalyptic tracts, ISIL calls the area “Khorasan”.
Weak governments and simmering Islamist sentiment make Khorasan fertile ground for jihadism. The US was able to bring formidable military assets to bear in Syria and Iraq. It cannot do that in Central Asia, nor should it want to. Khorasan will be a burden for Russia and China. Let the withdrawal continue.
© 2021Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.