Succession and military power in post-Khamenei Iran, part two 

Brian M Downing 

The mullahs from the IRGC perspective  

There are few young ayatollahs (or popes for that matter). The accreditation process is long and arduous and unrelated to governing a large country in parlous times. In terms of age, they are like the geriatric politburo of the Soviet Union during its last decade or the clique of Long March veterans surrounding Mao in the seventies. It’s unlikely the next Supreme Leader will be young.

The clergy has factions and they are well known to all Iranians. Some mullahs are of course austere in morality and governance. Others support reining in the virtue police and liberalizing society. A few want power to shift from the mullahs and generals to a representative government – parliament and a council of ministers.

The IRGC has factions. All institutions do. But there is little if any debate on political reforms in the direction of liberation, despite the claims of some scholars that the Koran’s reference to the Prophets shura calls for at least a measure of popular participation in government. An elected body with freedom of expression would, in the IRGC’s tendentious view, broadcast discontent to the nation and encourage separatism and western-style decay, and open up government to foreign manipulation. This is all inadvisable in peacetime let alone while the republic is imperiled.

In the IRGC’s view, the mullahs, whether in the hierocracy or elected government, have not shown political skill. The domestic policies of Khatami and Rouhani did not bolster the economy, even before sanctions came down. The failures have not eluded the public or the generals.

Mullahs in and out of the elected government have shown poor judgment in world affairs. They tried to reopen ties with the US in 2003 and were rejected by the Neoconservatives around Bush the Younger. A later mullah-president thought the JCPOA would open doors but only a few years later sanctions were reimposed by the Trump administration. The IRGC is convinced that anti-Iran sentiment is entrenched in American politics and no entreaties or deals can change that. 

The IRGC may also feel that the mullahs’ edict against WMDs cost tens of thousands of lives in the Iraq war and continues to endanger the country today. 

 

The IRGC from its own perspective

The generals rise to the top after specialized training and broad experience, often on battlefields. Some won their spurs in the Iraq war and turning Hisbollah militias into effective fighters in the eighties. A new generation is serving in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Unlike the ayatollahs, they rise to the top of their profession while still in their fifties and hence bring more energy and breadth.

The IRGC is far more cohesive than the clergy. They hence view themselves as more capable of leading the country in the sectarian conflict which will likely continue for many years. They also see see themselves as more skilled in directing military operations and diplomacy and ensuring domestic tranquillity. 

The generals may be looking to Moscow and Beijing as models and supporters. Russian tsars subjugated the Orthodox church centuries ago and treated harshly with those who opposed Peter the Great’s reforms. The communists suppressed religion, at least initially, but found it an important legitimizing force when the Third Reich invaded. Putin sees the same usefulness of caesaropapism. 

China looks askance at religion, especially cults. This is not so much because of residual Marxian ideas, more from seeing religions as potential enemies of the state, like the Muslims in the west and the Taipings of the 19th century, who brought a devastating civil war.

Both Russia and China see considerable value to partnership with Iran. It has oil, a modern economy, a large military, a common hostility to the US, and a strategic location. Iran’s leadership, however, must strike them as fairly useful at present but atavistic, impractical, and likely to wither away with a little help. 

© 2020 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.