Brian M Downing
As noted in previous articles, political, fiscal, and generational dynamics may one day undermine the US’s long-standing reliability as a strategic partner. Worries must be strong in Eastern Europe. Countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, such as the Baltic states, might be especially concerned as Putin is seen as determined to reestablish national power prestige and take his place in the Russian pantheon alongside Peter the Great, Nicholas I, and Joseph Stalin.
The region appears highly vulnerable. The recent example of Russian invasions of the Crimea and eastern Ukraine suggest just that. But the region has resources and options which if properly developed may daunt any invading army.
Strategic partners past
In coming decades, it’s entirely possible that the US will not be willing to come to the aid of eastern NATO partners – this despite those countries’ determined effort to win America’s loyalty by participation in the 2003 Iraq war and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.
Without US direction, the old NATO states, especially Britain, France, and Germany, are unlikely to rise to counter a Russian attack, despite treaty obligations. A century or more ago Western European publics thirsted for war and their governments sated it with colonial acquisitions and short conflicts on the continent. Then came the two massive bloodlettings of the 20th century and the thirst disappeared. Not many today think it’s fitting or just to die for their country. Almost none want to do so for, say, Estonia.
Eastern Europe might well be on its own. It might even be used by the West in a Munich-like bargain to placate Russia.
Eastern European nationalism
After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Bush the Elder assured the new Russian leadership that the West would not bring former Soviet satellites into NATO. Circumstances intervened. Fearing a resurgent Russia, Eastern European countries filed for NATO membership not long after the last Russian troops marched out.
NATO expansion played into Russian sensitivities of foreign danger. The 27 million dead of WW2 was in the living memory of many Russians and in the family lore of everyone else. It also played into the demise of representative government and public support for a strong leader (vozhd).
Gears kept turning. Resurgent Russia triggered nationalist responses in Eastern Europe. This makes for greater concern with Russian might and stronger determination to remain outside its sphere of influence. Martial spirit has been in decline in the West for decades and is reaching worrisome lows. It’s quite the opposite east of the Elbe.
Options
The armies of Eastern Europe must first of all professionalize their armies. Militaries are often adornments of rulers or instruments of repression or institutions dedicated to corruption and nepotism. This was the case in the Ukraine. Its troops, more practiced in relaxation than maneuvers, were baffled by the sudden presence of Russian troops. The thought of resistance barely occurred to them; the thought of surrender came soon enough.
Professionalization is easier said than done. Look at the Afghan military today, or the South Vietnamese military throughout the long war with the North. Politicians and generals prefer loyalty over competence and revenue over competence. Putin’s invasions of Georgia and the Ukraine might be bringing change.
Second, Eastern Europe can cooperate with one another on standards and training exercises – from Stettin in the Baltic to Odessa in the Black, one might say, though cooperation may extend into the Ukraine, Caucasus, and even the steppes of Kazakhstan along Russia’s southern periphery. It would be impolitic and unnecessary to keep western NATO partners out of the picture but a shift toward self-reliance can be made clear.
Third, eastern states should not base their armies exclusively on conventional warfare. The view here, developed after the Russian invasion of Georgia (2008), is that Moscow would have been warier of thousands of irregular guerrillas than by conventional forces. The presence of guerrillas would raise the specter of relentless attacks and a steady stream of casualties returning home – Afghanistan redux.
Russia learned a lesson from its occupation of Afghanistan, so should its adversaries today. Guerrillas may also train for operations across borders and into Russian territory from the Baltic to the steppes.
More can be added into the calculus: imported hi-tech weaponry, former special forces advisors, especially for guerrilla operations on both sides of the border (one of the original missions of US Green Berets), and the advantages of fighting from defensive positions. Eastern Europe has clear strategic assets of its own and need not be as vulnerable as it appears today.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.