Brian M Downing
President Trump has worried major NATO allies by his ill treatment of their leaders, general inattentiveness, and strange apologies for Russian actions. They wonder if his policies are based on sage counsel or business hopes after leaving office. Last week they were dismayed by his order to pull 12,000 GIs out of Germany. Half will come home, the rest will likely be sent to eastern NATO countries.
The Pentagon will drag its boots and hope for a new president in a few months. But the order stands and European states cannot like what they see taking place in the US. What does this mean for major NATO states such as Britain, Germany, and France, and for European security in general, as they face a resurgent Russia?
The US’s reliability
The longterm reliability of the US as a strategic partner and leader of the free world is in doubt. The term “free world” has fallen into disuse but global trends might make it important once again, perhaps more important than it was during the first Cold War.
Few can look upon the presidents of the last sixty years and see the character and vision of past leaders. Most have had relatively little experience in world affairs – unsurprising as Americans are drawn to outsiders, often from insular backgrounds. A few have made grievous blunders that have cost many lives and weakened the nation’s ability to manage world affairs. There’s little assurance that the trend will be reversed in coming years.
A generational shift is underway. Younger people are less attuned to history or foreign policy than previous generations. Military service is only family lore dating back to a distant period of conscription and citizenship. Their education and expectations center on domestic issues and personal matters. A consensus may be forming that is no less supportive of NATO than the current president is.
The US military remains well-trained, lavishly-equipped, and highly-motivated. The problem lies elsewhere. State and society are deeply polarized and increasingly antagonistic. Without unifying beliefs, America is wracked by violence, tribal identities, paranoid rumors, and anomie. It’s unclear if any society so deconstructed can stand up to Russia or China, let alone to Russia and China.
NATO responses
The major NATO states have options to enhance their security in face of American unreliability in coming years. They may choose to increase their own defense spending, cooperate more closely on joint exercises, and reintroduce conscription (already underway or in discussion in some member states).
However, European countries have long been reluctant to increase defense spending, especially as it entails domestic spending cuts. Further, they have their own generational shifts. Indeed, they are well ahead of the US in that regard.
A second option is to increase trade with Russia. Germany has been pursuing this for several years, most notably with pipelines bringing in Russian gas across the Baltic. Russian aggression could lead to reduced export revenue as Germany and other states shift to American, Israeli, or Gulf hydrocarbon sources. The transition could not be swift or painless for western countries, but it would be very hard on the relatively stagnant Russian economy.
Third, accelerated trade and diplomacy with China may give European states important leverage. Russia is the junior partner in the Moscow-Beijing alliance and Russian truculence in Eastern Europe advances no Chinese interests. Furthermore, China would welcome the role of mediator of world events – a position once held by the US.
Fourth, the major NATO states could strengthen strategic ties with the Ukraine, the Baltic states, and other former SSRs, especially in the Caucasus region. This, however, could have the adverse effect of deeply angering Russia.
Putin could respond by threatening those very former SSRs. This would raise the unsettling question of how likely Germany, Britain, and France are to defend NATO allies in the distant and exposed east. The former SSR’s might be in coming years what Czechoslovakia was in the late thirties.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.