Brian M Downing
Over the last century the United States has played crucial roles in world politics. In World War Two the US supplied the arms, oil, troops, and leadership that defeated Imperial Japan and the Third Reich. America’s respect and relative power in the world reached apogee in 1945.
The US then directed a global effort to contain communism and bring the Soviet Union down. Prior to WW2, most Americans abhorred foreign involvements. Afterward, they saw bearing burdens and opposing foes around the world as a defining part of their new national identity.
WW2 and the Cold War were won with critical partnerships – Britain, the Soviet Union, and scores of other countries in WW2; NATO allies and others in the Cold War. Today, the US is determined to counter Chinese and Russian power. How capable is the US to lead the confrontation in coming decades? How willing are countries around the world, including long-standing allies, to follow Washington’s lead?
Many allies looked upon American power during the Cold War with an element of resentment. They had once written their will across the world then had to look on as Washington did the same. The European powers were spectators or in limited to supporting roles. That sentiment persists but allies can point to American missteps and disasters that make them less willing to follow today.
The intervention in Vietnam failed to draw support from any European state, though Britain, France, and the Netherlands had had colonies there and still had business interests there. Only S Korea sent a sizable force. Postwar austerity played a role in Europe’s decision to stay out but astute local knowledge was at hand as well. War against an entrenched nationalist movement did not look promising. Escalations would ensue and drain resources away from more important regions. Stalemate and failure would mean less American resolve in the Cold War.
The First Gulf War (1991) ably demonstrated the US’s ability to once again marshal international support for a strategically important conflict. It also showed the tremendous superiority of US technology, doctrines, and combat cohesion – all of which were questioned or undermined during Vietnam. The swift victory renewed allies’ respect for America in world affairs which led to greater willingness to follow its lead after 9/11.
NATO partners sent troops to Afghanistan. Germany overcame concerns with the perception of resurgent militarism and its own public’s bourgeois comfort. The Taliban and al Qaeda were swiftly expelled and Washington led a postwar effort to modernize and democratize. Today the Afghan project is in ruins, several countries have pulled out, and even the US is looking for the exit. The heady plans of 2001 were foolhardy.
Following 9/11 Washington built a case for invading Iraq but met with limited support. Many claimed they were already at work in Afghanistan, others recognized the intelligence for what it was. The Second Gulf War made the region even more unstable, exacerbated sectarian hatreds, and provided a recruitment boon for al Qaeda and successor groups.
Today Washington has walked away from the JCPOA and is at daggers drawn with Iran. The US is alone. Allies in Europe and Asia doubt US and Israeli claims that Iran violated the JCPOA – and point to US and Israeli intelligence bureaus with the same doubts. European and Asian allies see Iran as a promising trade partner, not as a budding nuclear power or threat to regional stability.
As the Trump administration confronts China and Russia, it may expect reflexive support from allies, especially in military resources. However, foreign governments and publics think back to a string of blunders. They see US foreign policy inordinately shaped by special interests, campaign contributions, and media outlets.
Worsening matters is a president who invokes US prestige and might but has little idea of the importance traditional allies were in defeating enemies and making America great.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.