Brian M Downing
Word came this week that the Saudi cadet who killed three American servicemen in Pensacola in January had ties to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Someone with deep hatred for the US and almost certainly for Saudi Arabia, or at least its monarchy, got through the security checks of both countries.
Concern naturally arises over the orientations of other cadets from Gulf countries who remain in the classroom and more worrisomely, in the air. Another concern is how prevalent AQ and ISIL sympathies are in the armed forces back in Saudi Arabia.
There are almost half a million Saudis in the regular army, which is composed of national conscripts and about 325,000 in the national guard, which is based on tribal levies. With so many young men in the armed forces, some will naturally hold hardline Islamist beliefs. The kingdom has much to lead them that way.
Militaries and revolt
Armies are usually stalwart defenders of their governments from opposition foreign and domestic. But when rulers are judged to have betrayed national ideals, their armies turn on them and seize power, or try to.
After the poor showing in the Napoleonic Wars, Russian officers revolted against the tsar and generals who allowed Moscow to be take and almost lost Mother Russia. As Americans began to encroach upon Japan’s sovereignty, the feudal-military barons overthrew the shogunate and began sweeping reforms – the Meiji Restoration. In the aftermath of World War One, Turkish generals overthrew the Ottomans and instituted secular reforms.
In the early fifties, Nasser and like-minded colonels overthrew a corrupt king and the generals he had appointed. Iraqi officers did the same a few years later, as did Qaddafi in Libya at the end of the sixties.
What discontent exists in the Saudi armed forces today that may pose a problem for the monarchy?
Incompetence
Soldiers want to be proud of more than smart uniforms and crisp salutes on parade grounds. They want to be part of a professional organization dedicated and qualified to protecting their nation and families. Saudi soldiers cannot feel that way, despite Riyadh’s proclamations, slogans, and parades.
The Saudi military has no victories since Abdul Aziz gathered the tribal levies and drove out the Rashidis and Hashemites. The army of today has a long string of failures. In 1979 a few hundred zealots seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca and held on to it for two weeks. French commandos had to be called in to direct the operation to retake the holy site.
In Gulf War One (1991) General Shwarzkopf judged the Saudi formations unfit for combat and deployed them behind western troops. Saudi forces stayed aloof from the ISIL wars in Syria and Iraq, even though the fighting was close to the borders – and many young Saudis were fighting in ISIL bands.
In Yemen Saudi troops patrol rear areas. When the Houthis crossed into the kingdom, the Saudi troops scattered in disarray. Iranian drones managed to damage oil facilities even though the monarchy had spent extensively on air defense systems. The US deployed an air defense battery.
There are many reasons for this dismal record including tribal heterogeneity and lax training. One of the more important reasons – and one that will readily occur to and energize discontented soldiers – is the prevalence of high-ranking officers who owe their positions not to professional qualifications but to personal connections to the royals. Able young men from middle-class backgrounds unconnected to the royals languish in mid-level ranks while more privileged people are made colonels and generals.
Notions of manhood and honor inspire soldiers around the world. However, in Saudi soldiers they have an ironic quality, for now.
Part two: the crown prince, Wahhabism, and possible actions
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.