Brian M Downing
On-and-off talks between the US and the Taliban have brought a temporary reduction in hostilities and the prospect of US troop withdrawals and more substantive peace talks. Kabul is balking, fighting flares here and there, but there’s room for optimism that we can finally be rid of a long, costly, and futile war.
Voices in Afghanistan, the US, and elsewhere claim that President Trump wants out of the country come what may and that Afghanistan will fall to the Taliban not long after the last GIs head out.
The obvious comparison is to the US departure from S Vietnam in 1973 which led to Saigon’s fall two years later (exactly as an experienced green beret officer told me at the time). However, communist troops did not weaken or want for money and S Vietnam had no regional help. The Taliban may well weaken and regional powers will take keen interest.
Taliban viability
After being driven from Kabul in late 2001, the Taliban reconstituted itself and formed an effective insurgency against US and foreign occupation. It was never a solid political-military organization as, say, the Vietnamese communists were. The Taliban comprise a slew of tribal levies drawn from disaffected Pashtuns in the south and east.
They do not fight for a political ideology or Afghanistan’s future, they fight only to rid their districts of foreigners. They are parochial rather than national. They have not hefted Kalashnikovs to unify a nation, as did the Viet Cong and NVA. Once western personnel leave their districts, many Taliban fighters will celebrate, then head for home.
This is what happened to most mujahideen units after Soviet troops withdrew in 1989 and recurrence is likely once the US and NATO depart – hopefully more gracefully than did the Russians. The Taliban won’t collapse altogether but their capacity for offensive operations will be limited.
Reconstruction aid
The Taliban will govern large portions of the south and east and have to deal with the burdens of reconstruction and development. They faced those problems in the 90s. Foreign aid and opium revenue were woefully insufficient and unrest and even insurgencies were spreading.
A peace agreement will grant foreign subsidies to Kabul. That’s an essential part of any deal. Kabul will disburse money to various peoples and tribes, including the Taliban. If the Taliban try to expand, they’ll get cut off and unrest will ensue. Compliance, on the other hand, will ensure money, reconstruction, and the opportunity for a viable autonomous emirate within Afghanistan.
Continuing the comparison to Vietnam, communist forces did not need the US money promised in the peace agreement. They were handsomely funded by the Soviet Union and China and that allowed them to conquer the South in two years.
Regional powers
When the last GIs left S Vietnam in early 1973, there were no neighboring states supportive of Saigon. Australia and Thailand had pulled their troops out too; Cambodia and Laos were crumbling; and other states had no interest. S Vietnam was alone.
That’s not the case in Afghanistan. Three neighboring states are already involved and want the Taliban kept in check. Russia, China, and Iran are concerned with the spread of jihadism into their own lands or regions considered their backyards. Russia has developed ties with northern leaders, especially the Uzbeks. Iran has long supported the Tajiks and Hazaras.
Russia and Iran have in recent years given arms and money to the Taliban. They did so in order to bleed the US and to establish ties with a movement they deemed an inevitable if regrettable winner in the south and east. Those ties will persist and can be used to restrain the Taliban.
China has been quietly buying up Afghan copper, iron, rare earths, and oil. Afghanistan is a foreign subsidiary which Beijing hopes will one day become highly profitable. An aggressive Taliban is a threat to Chinese ambitions in Afghanistan and to the north in Central Asia.
Leaving Afghanistan, then, is unlikely to lead to the collapse of the Afghan government, frail, venal, and unpopular though it is. The US can look back on 18 years of effort, move on, and learn from the experience.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.