Brian M Downing
The Sahel is losing ground to Islamist and separatist groups. What options are available to France, the US, and local governments?
Foreign combat troops
The most obvious answer is to deploy French and American ground troops – not just advisors and trainers, battalions of combat troops. Drone surveillance could detect rebel troop movements over the relatively flat, open terrain, and airmobile reaction-forces hit them hard. This could ease pressure on government outposts and limit rebel expansion.
Foreign troops would have several adverse consequences, even if western publics somehow overcame their antipathy toward more engagements in the Islamic world. They would increase local resentments, decrease governments’ already low disposition toward reform, and provide no incentive for troops to become more competent.
Counterinsurgency
Governments alongside French and US personnel could increase the flow of materiel (seeds, irrigation pumps, machinery) and services (schools, medical and veterinary teams, well-digging). This would hopefully separate local populations from rebel forces and reconcile rural areas with capitals.
Counterinsurgency doctrines (COIN) are often seen as a thoughtful and relatively inexpensive alternative to regular warfare. The doctrines’ successes, however are fewer than thought. The US military is loth to develop COIN expertise for fear of being deployed into more and more insurgencies.
Embattled governments are usually too corrupt to enact effective COIN programs. Officials and local notables siphon off resources for personal gain, sharpening local hostilities. The best equipment goes to the privileged, roads are never paved, schools go unbuilt. Only bank accounts prosper, usually ones in Switzerland.
Enmity in rebel regions is often too strong and entrenched to be mollified by sudden largesse from faraway elites. And Islamists have greater goals than better crop yields and more schools. They want a caliphate.
Local militias
National and foreign trainers could build up local militias to fight the rebels. This assumes a substantial degree of hostility between many locals and rebel forces. This isn’t uncommon as rebels use horrific attacks to demonstrate the central government’s inability to protect civilians and their own omnipotence. Islamist zeal for grisly displays is well known and boundless.
Burkina Faso is exploring this approach but most governments are reluctant to arm local militias, unless they are firmly integrated with army and state – a difficult feat for inept governments. States do not like giving out arms and power as they worry about getting them back. Samuel Huntington urged arming religious sects in South Vietnam but it went nowhere. Kabul has opposed arming Pashtun tribes, despite their hostility to the Taliban. Baghdad is losing out to militias.
Ceding territory
The unattractive alternatives outlined above might make abandoning swathes of land to the rebels at least somewhat attractive. The periphery can be patrolled and local armies can gain experience and confidence. Rebel forces will continue to suffer casualties along the periphery and on sorties into government territory.
Rebels will also be saddled by the burden of government and placating disparate groups – precisely the nettlesome position of central governments.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.