Brian M Downing
Rulers often establish their power prestige through military victory. Alexander, Charlemagne, and Napoleon stand out. Communism might not have long endured in Russia had Stalin’s rule not been infused by defeating the Third Reich. The same is true of the House of Saud’s rule. Abdul Aziz vanquished Hashemite and Rashidi rivals and made his family the masters of the peninsula.
Serious defeats weaken rulers. Publics doubt what was once above question. Privileged groups are seen as failures unworthy of high trust. Rival families and parties vie for control. The First World War gravely damaged the power prestige of all belligerents. Three dynasties fell. The Argentine junta went to war with Britain in 1982 in order to bolster flagging legitimacy. Defeat brought them down in days.
The House of Saud’s power prestige rests mainly on distant memories of Abdul Aziz, a remarkably well-appointed military, but chiefly on generous disbursements of petrodollars – the cash nexus as it’s been called. Riyadh’s prestige has been dealt several blows in recent years. The princes aren’t likely to go the way of Hohenzollern, Habsburg, and Romanov monarchs in the near future, but their legitimacy and hold of power may be slipping.
Military situation
The Saudis have been trying to expand their power in the region by building mosques and schools. In Syria, however, they supported militant groups against the Shia/Alawi regime. They failed. Riyadh is presently offering Damascus heaps of reconstruction aid in exchange for a break with Tehran. This has failed too so far.
Wars in Syria and Iraq caused the spread of militant jihadi groups, including al Qaeda and ISIL. The US organized a response but Saudi forces barely figured in it. Western armies carried the load. Saudi subjects figured prominently in the jihadis, however.
Yemen’s third civil war began as the result of Riyadh’s effort to Wahhabize the country, which led to the Houthi movement in the Shia north. Saudi grounds forces in the south patrol rear areas but do not venture near the frontlines. Saudi aircraft strike routinely and often inaccurately. Civilian deaths are high.
In recent days drones and cruise missiles, probably from Iran, struck two Saudi oil facilities. Houthi forces crossed into Saudi territory and inflicted serious casualties on three Saudi brigades. Large numbers seem to have surrendered.
Saudi response
Riyadh’s bid for regional mastery isn’t going well. A string of failures calls for a response but there are few promising options.
The Saudis could mobilize forces for an incursion into northern Yemen, either as a simply retaliatory measure or a sustained operation aimed at delivering a decisive blow. Possible, but even the headiest prince must now realize his troops lack fighting spirit. Further, a push into Yemen would mean attacking the Houthis in defensive positions on their home territory.
Punitive airstrikes would risk less but they’d entail more civilian casualties and increase sympathy for the Houthis. The war already has a David vs Goliath aspect in many foreign publics.
Riyadh could call in defense-spending markers and prod the US to intervene. Its argument would of course outline a brief, limited campaign that would end the war in a couple months, at most. The argument will fall on deaf ears in the Pentagon and only a handful of figures around the president would even entertain the idea. The president’s amenability can’t be known.
A final option would be to negotiate a settlement partitioning the country along sectarian lines. The UAE is already advancing this. Partition would allow the Saudis to declare victory and go home. However, it would signal defeat and leave a militarily-capable enemy to the south align with Iran.
Inside the kingdom
The reversals cannot have gone unnoticed by the kingdom’s millions of subjects. A large segment of the population under the age of thirty sees few opportunities for careers let alone voices in government.
Liberal reformers, supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, reproving Wahhabists, jealous tribal chiefs, jealous members of the royal family, and supporters of al Qaeda and ISIL may have little in common except for increasing disgust with the ruling clique. They may point to money squandered abroad and decadent lifestyles, and now also to an ineffectual military and the increasing presence of American troops.
A revolution probably isn’t in store but Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s position in the line of succession might be questioned, perhaps even challenged. Gulf states such as Qatar, Oman, and possibly even the UAE may support his removal. The US would be well advised to help them.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.