Escalation, de-escalation, and reaction in the Gulf

Brian M Downing 

Escalation in the Saudi-Iranian conflict reached a new high last week with aerial strikes on Saudi oil facilities. The US immediately blamed Iran and expectations were that punishing retaliation was coming. Thus far, however, the US has only imposed more sanctions on Iran and sent an air defense unit to the kingdom, presumably to make up for the poor showing of Saudi units last week. This escalation may in fact be de-escalation.

Washington may realize that Iran will match any US measure and is backed by Russia and China – silently for now but perhaps more forcefully later. It’s also clear the Saudi military is appallingly inept and US allies are not on board. If there’s war, the US will be almost alone. What’s next?

Iran’s response 

Last week’s pause shifted attention to Tehran’s next step. First, it may use diplomacy to build consensus for a ceasefire and talks. Smaller regional states such as Qatar and Oman may help as they do not want the neighborhood destroyed by regional powers and their foreign backers. The EU and Asian countries, especially major oil importers, will support diplomacy. Russia and China are both eager to see US power blunted and the present situation offers an excellent opportunity to advance that cause. 

Second, Iran may opt to continue actions such as seizing tankers and hitting limited targets in Sunni states. This will show the emptiness of the US Iran policy and deepen the gap between Washington and traditional allies. This option suggests Iran has solid backing from Russia and China. 

This risks backfiring as Donald Trump is one of the least predictable leaders a major power has ever had. Further, while the US military isn’t supportive of action against Iran, further strikes may make the generals see an aggressive response as essential to US credibility.

Regional responses 

Saudi Arabia and perhaps the Emirates do not want to see tensions ease without Iran seriously weakened, by the US. They will parley, threaten to buy their arms from non-western countries, and perhaps launch strikes of their own to re-heat things. 

Israel has thus far been a major part of the anti-Iran effort, if not the catalyst. But the policy’s architect, Benjamin Netanyahu, may be on his way out. His likely successor, former army chief of staff Benny Gantz, may have a more practical view toward Iran that recalls its usefulness against Sunni powers, which began with Israel’s founding and even persisted well after the Khomeini revolution. Geopolitics triumphed over ideology. With Netanyahu gone, it may triumph once again.

A less discernible response but perhaps the most worrisome one longterm will be in Arab publics. The presence of US troops is irksome. Indeed, it led to attacks on the Khobar Towers and later on New York and Washington. The recent strike inside the kingdom has underscored the sybaritic regime’s ineffectualness and reliance on the US. The House of Saud’s efforts to strengthen itself are weakening it. It’s heading for a legitimacy crisis, though from behind the palace curtains this might not be apparent yet. Unfortunately, US troops inside the kingdom may be targeted, as may the thousands of others sent into Syria, Iraq, and Jordan in recent years. 

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.