Brian M Downing
Foreign policy has to deal with unexpected events. That’s the nature of the undertaking. The process is burdened by group think, inexperienced leaders and appointees, and pressure from lobbies – few of which call for less interventionism or see policies as unworkable. Grandiosity and arcaneness can confer workability in the high councils. Some outsiders see through it.
In 2009, shortly after the beginning of the Obama presidency, foreign policy experts met. The US had been ordered out of Iraq the previous year and attention shifted to Afghanistan. The war was entering its ninth year and the Taliban were gaining ground. More troops and money weren’t working,
The alternatives
Complete withdrawal wasn’t an option. Nor was abandoning the south and concentrating on the north where the Taliban then had little support (as was recommended here). There were only two real alternatives. First, concentrate on destroying al Qaeda and put aside the modernization and democratization schemes from the heady days just after 9/11. Second, adopt counterinsurgency doctrines, win over the Afghan people, and bring stability and prosperity.
Joe Biden, VP and former head of the Senate foreign relations committee, was skeptical of counterinsurgency and nation-building. He supported the first alternative of a limited program concentrating on al Qaeda – snatch-and-grab ops and drone strikes. He was backed by two other domestic advisers, Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod. Neither was well versed in world affairs, neither’s counsel carried weight.
The COIN consensus
At the time of the Afghan conferences, counterinsurgency (COIN) was the promising way to turn the tide. The doctrine has a long, disputed history.
During the Vietnam War, COIN had advocates such as John Paul Vann and Robert Komer but remained second to conventional warfare. COIN became an important part of postwar writings. It was the path not taken. Hidebound traditionalists had won out over young, unconventional strategists, and we lost. COIN promised a new approach to wars. Our TE Lawrences would win indigenous support and bring victory. No more costly stalemates along long fronts.
The Afghan debate took place not long after Gen Petraeus’s counterinsurgency campaign (COIN) curtailed the insurgency in Iraq, or at least seemed to. COIN was praised in military seminars, think tanks, and media. It was the smart way to fight insurgencies. A powerful consensus formed among military and intelligence leaders. Several books promulgated the new gospel.
The skepticism of Joe Biden et al was given fair hearing, perhaps, but never stood a chance against the doctrinal truth of the day. They were novices, outsiders, pols. The irremediable corruption of the Kabul government, Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, dependency on supply routes controlled by Vladimir Putin, and lingering local enmity after eight years of heavy firepower and collateral damage would pose no obstacle to COIN Doctrine.
Ten years, billions of dollars, and hundreds of GI lives later, the war continues on. COIN was quietly pushed aside years ago and new commanders have come and gone. (There’ve been sixteen since 2001.) COIN doctrine is still debated. Even its apparent success in Iraq is contested.
We’re still in Afghanistan and so is al Qaeda. We shoulda listened to Joe.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.