Brian M Downing
The Syrian government has won the upper hand on the ground owing to Hisbollah ground troops, his own airpower, and the failure of most rebel groups to develop into skilled fighting forces. Rebel groups are in considerable disarray and fighting each other fiercely in several parts of the country. The Syrian government is playing upon these divisions by helping, albeit indirectly, al Qaeda groups operating in the country – the al Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
The government is withholding operations against AQ positions thereby reducing their casualties, and concentrating on other rebel forces of the Free Syrian Army and Islamic Front. Damascus is also releasing AQ prisoners to return to their former units as they battle other rebel groups. The move is a clever way to play upon divisions on the rebel side but it is not without risks – for Syria and Iraq as well.
The al Qaeda forces are among the best on the rebel side. The strict Salafist ideology provides a basis for unit cohesion and hierarchical discipline leading to superior fighting ability compared to most other rebel forces, whose discipline and small-unit tactics are abysmal. The superiority of AQ units, however, is more than offset by their brutality, both against Syrian troops who fall into their hands and civilians who come under their rule. AQ harshness has badly damaged the image of all rebel forces. Many foreign powers are uncertain as to what ousting Assad will usher in, and foreign publics are reluctant if not unwilling to risk further involvement. Seeking to restore their movement’s image and foreign support, the FSA and the Islamic Front are now fighting AQ troops.
In this context, Assad is helping AQ by releasing their prisoners from his holding pens and attacking only FSA and Islamic Front forces. He is achieving success by allowing his fractious opponents to bludgeon each other. Should the FSA and Islamic Front emerge victorious, they will be severely weakened and no match for Assad’s forces. Should fortune favor AQ, foreign support for the rebels will evaporate and outside powers will rethink the notion of ousting Assad.
In using al Qaeda, Assad is sowing the proverbial wind. What Syria and the entire region may reap one day is uncertain. First, al Qaeda may emerge victorious from the ongoing war with other rebel groups. After all, it has the best troops and equipment. It may ensconce itself more firmly in parts of Syria, especially the more remote eastern region where it will strengthen its hold on western Iraq and form an Islamist bastion straddling the Syria-Iraq border. This will of course greatly anger Assad’s allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran yet at the same time present outside powers such as Saudi Arabia and the West with a painful choice of backing him or the al Qaeda-dominated rebellion or detaching themselves from the conflict altogether.
Second, al Qaeda may lose out to the numerically superior forces of the FSA and the Islamic Front. If so, the latter will be greatly weakened and perhaps even discredited abroad as a congeries of squabbling factions.
Third, there may be a bloody protracted stalemate in the war between rebel factions. Assad will then be able to strengthen his control over many parts of the country while his enemies wear each other down. Many parts of the Syrian public may reluctantly view Assad as the least of many evils and as the only guarantor of order in the country.
The various rebel factions may be judicious enough to see the problems inherent in protracted factional warfare and refrain from it. The al Qaeda chieftain Ayman al-Zawahiri has already recognized the problem and called for rebel sides to avoid playing into Assad’s hand. This recognition may lead to a measure of cooperation among the factions and perhaps also to recognition of each other’s territorial control of various parts of Syria, at least for a while.
© 2014 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic, a novel set in the ongoing Iranian-Israeli conflict. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.