Brian M Downing
Two years ago sabers rattled noisily and ominously in East Asia. North Korea was testing nuclear weapons and launching long-range missiles capable of hitting parts of the US. The Trump administration replied with threats to destroy “little rocket man’s” country. Suddenly and unexpectedly, Trump and Kim exchanged cordial messages and held a preliminary meeting in Singapore. Something was afoot.
The much-awaited second meeting took place last week in Hanoi. The site was significant. Vietnam is a former bitter enemy of the US that’s now concerned with China’s rising power. However, the US and N Korea apparently put forth unexpected positions and the summit ended early – the product of each leader’s amateurism and headiness. Another summit will probably take place in coming months though. Both sides want more than talk. They want something big.
That something will not be the North’s giving up its nuclear weapons. They are too important to its power prestige, at home and abroad, and make N Korea invasion-proof. Kim Jong On knows what every analyst in the world knows: if Saddam had had nuclear weapons he’d be in power today.
If not denuclearization, what might that something big be? It would entail an important shift in East Asia’s security, but to whose advantage? Let’s consider two scenarios, each of which hinges on Kim’s response to rising Chinese power around him.
N Korea coaxed out of the Chinese sphere
The People’s Republic of China is a rising power in the world, especially so in East Asia. It’s built artificial islands and placed military hardware on them. It claims islands and waters that neither neighbors nor international organizations recognize. Its ships menace those of Japan and the Philippines. China is taking steps, if clumsy ones, to replace the US as guarantor of East Asia’s security and prosperity.
N Korea plays an important role in China’s plans. Pyongyang’s angry rhetoric, backed up by a sizable military, worry and preoccupy the US, S Korea, and Japan. The US-N Korea dialog could, if directed by skillful arguments from Washington and followed by bold decisions in Pyongyang, change the region’s power relations – and thoroughly upset Beijing’s strategic plans.
N Korea is not going to turn against China and move into the US-S Korea-Japan sphere. That would risk irresistible reform pressures someday and eventual loss of sovereignty. But the North might be convinced of advantages to a middle position between the two powers – gaining from both, depending on neither.
The North could benefit from competitive forces, though not the ones championed by Adam Smith and Milton Friedman. It could get investment money and trade deals from the US and its allies and from China as well. Each side would be fearful of losing out to the other. Tito played this game with the US and USSR during the Cold War.
Kim Jong On would have a more robust economy and more extensive resources. He would be more independent too – no longer a vassal to Chinese suzerains. Nor would he be deemed the weak scion of an exalted family. He would accomplish more for his country than did his father and grandfather. Or so will go the flattering prose of adroit negotiators across the table from him. Donald Trump has many limitations, but he may be well suited for this task.
Washington will have achieved a strategic coup. Its military assets will be somewhat freer, Beijing’s considerably less so. As noted, Pyongyang will never relinquish its nuclear weapons. But Washington will find considerable benefit if at least some of them are one day aimed at China.
America loses standing
N Korea might be using the dialog to advance its interests – and those of China – to the detriment of America’s position in the region. The two powers confer exceptionally often as of late. Kim may accept that China is destined to become the most important country in the world and the undisputed master of East Asia. He may want to play a role in the unfolding of the geopolitical shift. And Beijing may be providing his cues.
The Trump-Kim dialog could be a ruse. The charade of diplomacy and assurances will lead nowhere except a seemingly dangerous level of vitriol and threats. At this point in the drama, China will intervene and ease tensions. An agreement will be reached on Pyongyang’s military tests, with investment money from Seoul as part of the deal.
The message will be clear. The US is no longer capable of managing East Asia’s security. Beijing is far better positioned to perform that vital job – a great leap forward in the direction of regional hegemony.
The ruse and denouement could be more effective if the American response to a breakdown in talks is especially belligerent. Donald Trump may be well suited for this task as well.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.