Brian M Downing
President Trump announced a complete pullout from Syria late last year. Not long thereafter, generals and allies talked him out of it. His most recent “position” is to withdraw the bulk of the 2,000 troops but keep a force of 200 in eastern Syria. The pullout hasn’t taken place yet and may never.
How did we get involved in eastern Syria? What will the last 200 GIs do there?
The Levant campaigns
The Obama administration was not eager to get involved in Syria, perhaps because Assad seemed doomed and it was better to work with external groups on a transition and recovery. The war dragged on and the administration felt the need to do something, regardless of practicality and consequences. However, US-backed forces disintegrated shortly after crossing into Syria or went over to Turkish employ.
ISIL’s growing presence in Syria forced a more determined approach. US forces cobbled together a miscellany of Kurdish and Arab militias, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have performed quite well, retaking almost all of ISIL’s once sprawling domain. Remaining troops will serve several purposes.
Monitor ISIL. The Islamist group will soon hold almost nothing. Having lost its armor, artillery, and transport, it’s no longer capable of another 2014 blitzkrieg. It is, however, capable of operating as an underground group in both Syria and Iraq. It will benefit from ISIL and Salafi networks across the Middle East, perhaps especially in Jordan and Iraq. ISIL might keep it up for many years.
Pressure Iran. The US and its regional allies, mainly Saudi Arabia and Israel, are determined to expel Iranian troops and their proxies from Syria. SDF troops will shift focus from ISIL to the IRGC and Iran-backed Shia militias.
Block the Shia Corridor. Land communication lines between Iran on the one hand and Syria and Hisbollah on the other will be endangered by US-backed troops.
Sunni statelet-formation. Regional allies are determined to weaken Iranian-Shia power and want a Kurdish-Arab region to serve that purpose. The Kurds have demonstrated their military value repeatedly and Riyadh wants them to become a significant part of its regional power, along with Egypt and Pakistan. The dream of an independent Kurdistan in Iraq collapsed when Turkey closed off its oil pipeline. Perhaps Kurdish oil will flow south into the Saudi network someday.
Bargaining chip with Damascus. Instead of forming a Sunni statelet, the US-SDF position could become a negotiating point. Saudi Arabia and its allies want Damascus to reorient itself away from the Iranian sphere to the Saudi one. The Sunni powers will offer reconstruction aid, far more than Iran can afford just now, and the US will offer to turn over eastern Syria, restoring Damascus’s territorial integrity, at least most of it.
The US force’s roles
Remaining troops will continue to train and advise SDF troops. The smaller the number, the less likely they are to serve as a reaction force as their counterparts in Afghanistan are required to do when Afghan positions falter.
They will also interact with American and allied airpower which will perform reconnaissance missions and strike enemy troop positions. The threat of ISIL concentrations is receding but Iranian and Syrian troops may probe SDF positions and American resolve.
US troops may have to manage the heterogeneous militias of the SDF. They are united for the moment against ISIL but success can rekindle old animosities and rivalries.
Their most important mission is unstated but it’s surely occurred to the more seasoned of the US contingent who’ve been whipsawed by conflicting statements from Washington. They are there to keep US options open – ceding the region to Damascus in exchange for a break with Tehran, setting the stage for a Sunni buffer state, or just holding ground and keeping their powder dry.
Problems
The longer the US stays in eastern Syria (and Iraq), the more ISIL and al Qaeda will benefit. They will argue the US is grabbing resources and humiliating their brethren. They will go on that their forces caused decadent local rulers to tremble and forced them to call in foreign troops to keep them in power. The first argument is specious but will find receptive ears. The second is true and beyond debate.
The US presence is open-ended. The US has had troops in the Balkans for two decades, Sinai for twice that, and Europe since Berlin fell in 1945. Whatever the US troop level in eastern Syria, they will be in a remote, landlocked part of a hostile region that’s engaged in a deepening Sunni-Shia conflict.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.