Brian M Downing
The US and Pakistan have been uneasy partners ever since the latter came into existence in 1947 and the Cold War began. Since then, Pakistan had several descents into military rule, started wars with India (and lost every time), produced nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT, and spread an especially vicious fusion of nationalism and Islam.
Pakistan has also supported a slew of terrorist organizations including al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad. Last week’s attack on Indian troops in Kashmir is the most recent example of Pakistan-backed attacks on neighbors. American foreign policy is in a state of flux, sometimes for the good, sometimes not. The US is considering ending its 18-year quest to bring a modern democracy and economy to Afghanistan. It might also consider greatly reducing relations with Pakistan.
Strategic value
Alliances are supposed to increase national security. The Pakistani army, though large and well-equipped, has shown little competence in war. It has stumbled into or initiated wars with India which though not aligned by treaty with the US, has more economic and strategic value and is more supportive of democratic processes.
The Pakistani army is far more practiced at repressing dissent, killing journalists, and staging coups. With every setback and defeat the army becomes more obsessed with blaming others, repressing dissent, and creating the illusion of efficacy by defying international agreements and norms.
Terrorism
The loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the 1971 war was a severe blow to the army’s prestige and honor. It responded by officially encouraging a belligerent fusion of nationalism and religion. The army orthodoxy draws from the subcontinent’s Deobandi sect and has won financial support from Saudi Arabia, whose Wahhabism parallels Deobandism. Determined to prevent further loss of territory, the generals spreads the ideology in mosques, madrasas, civic associations, professional schools, and state propaganda.
The orthodoxy, hostile to Hindus, Christians, Shias, and Jews alike, is conducive to terrorist outlooks. The army supports Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to intimidate the country’s Shia population – an effort aided by Saudi Arabia after the Khomeini revolution in 1979. Determined to exact revenge on India, the army supports Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. They’ve attacked India several times. Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack, Jaish-e-Mohammad for last week’s attack on Indian troops in Kashmir. Both groups have trained with al Qaeda in a haven along the Af-Pak border.
Instability
An ally of course should not be so roiled by internal fissures as to question its viability. The Pakistani political system is dominated by two rivalrous elites – generals and estate owners. Each vies for popular support, wins it for a while, but never establishes fair or even competent government. Population pressures are becoming ominous.
The country also faces two serious separatist movements. The Balochs of the west, about 40% of the country’s territory, have been fighting intermittent insurgencies since they were forcibly integrated with Pakistan in 1947. The Pashtun of the northwest have enjoyed autonomy since British rule and are increasingly resentful of the army and state’s presence. Paradoxically, the Pashtun have accepted the nationalist-religious creed and see the government as betraying it by cooperating with the US.
Afghanistan
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US opted to invade Afghanistan and align more closely with Pakistan – a dual blunder. The effort to democratize and modernize Afghanistan was unrealistic from the start and disastrous 18 years on. Further, trusting Pakistan showed Washington and Langley’s profound ignorance of the country’s relationship with the Taliban.
The Pakistani generals see the Taliban as an ally against India and a conduit for commerce with Central Asian countries. Pakistan’s Frontier Corps served alongside the Taliban in the civil war years after the Soviet withdrawal and fought the US and the Northern Alliance in 2001. Today, Pakistan offers the Taliban supplies and safe havens, all the while officially supporting the American-Kabul side – Catch-22 along the Durand Line.
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Reducing support to Pakistan must of course come along with getting out of Afghanistan, whether by negotiated settlement or strategic reappraisal or White House whim. This would cause the Pakistani generals to swing hard to China, or try to. They will likely find Beijing and Washington having remarkably similar views on their country’s reliability, usefulness, longterm viability, and partnerships with terrorism.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.